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BALANCING CULTURAL INTEGRITY AGAINST
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY: CIVIL COURT REVIEW
OF ECCLESIASTICAL JUDGMENTS
Michael G. Weisberg*
The image of the melting pot depicts our nation of immigrants
as a crucible in which ethnic peoples of every description are
forged into "Americans," free from the identities they left behind
in their countries of origin.1 Not all immigrants came here with
the purpose of shedding their old identities, however. Some
groups, such as the Amish and the Hasidic Jews, came here with
the intention of remaining distinct from the rest of American
society.2 The Mormons and many Native American nations
attempted to avoid or even violently resisted the authority of the
United States,3 and African slaves came here against their will.
4
Even when immigrants sought to assimilate into "American"
society, they often retained some aspects of their ancestral
heritage. One of the most durable of these aspects was religion.
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1. Eg., ALAN M. KRAU, THE HUDDLED MASSES: THE IMMIGRANT IN AMERICAN SOCIEIY,
1880-1921, at 145-46(1982); seegenerally ISRAEL ZANGWILL,THE MELTING-POT: DRAMA
IN FOUR ACTS (1930).
2. Eg., LEONARD DINEMSrIN & DAVID M. REIMERS, ETHNIC AMERICANS: A HISTORY
OF IMMIGRATION AND ASSIMILATION 139,151 (Irwin Unger ed., 1975). The Dutch Calvinists
who settled in Western Michigan and other parts of the Upper Midwest represent another
group of immigrants who sought to retain their cultural distinctness. JAMES OLSON, THE
ETHNIC DIMENSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY 90-93 (1979).
3. See generally DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE AN INDIAN HISTORY
OF THE AMERCAN WEST (1970 WALACE STEGNER, THE GATHERING OF ZION: THE STORY OF THE
MORMON TRAIL (1964).
4. Despite the undeniable ravages of slavery, the emancipated slaves retained many
elements of the African cultures from which their ancestors had been taken. Seegenerally
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL TliE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE (1974, SrERLING
SIUCE, SLAVE CIURE NATIONA[Br THEORY AND THE F nAicm OF BLX AMECA (19871
Remnants of these African cultures persist in African-American society today. MELVILLE
J. HERSKOVITS, THE MYTH OF THE NEGRO PAST 143-291 (1958).
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Indeed, some researchers have observed that the United States
is actually a nation of multiple melting pots defined by religion.5
Ethnicity often loses significance over the course of several
generations, but religion continues to distinguish one group of
people from another.6
Religious cultures encompass their own sets of traditions, laws,
values, and beliefs. 7 The religion clauses of the First Amend-
ment' foster the preservation of distinct religious cultures by
prohibiting government from interfering with religious beliefs,9
and from showing a preference for one set of religious beliefs- or
non-belief- above another. °  The clauses guarantee each
religious group the freedom to interpret its own laws and
doctrines, to maintain standards of behavior for its members,
and even to organize its own judicial system."
5. See, e.g., DImNERSTEIN & REInERS, supra note 2, at 146-47.
6. Researchers have found, for example, that when members of immigrant societies
begin to marry outside of their ethnic groups in large numbers, they still exhibit a strong
tendency to marry within their religious groups. More recent research suggests that
even religion gradually loses significance. See id. at 147-49. It might be more accurate,
however, to conclude that the barriers between different religious cultures become more
permeable over time, so that individuals have greater freedom to move from one religious
group to another, but that religious cultures continue to exhibit many of their distinct
characteristics. For a discussion of the debate that this permeability has generated within
the Jewish community as American Jews seek to ensure the survival of a distinct Jewish
culture in this country, see Peter Steinfels, Debating Intermarriage, and Jewish Survival,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1992, § 1, at 1.
7. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-13, 216-19 (1972) (discussing
Amish traditions, values, and religious beliefs). Religious groups may see their own law
as equal or superior to secular law and may view religious and secular law as competing
against each other. Carol Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on
Constitutionalism and Religious Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741, 745-47 (1987-88).
8. The First Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. CONST. amend.
I.
9. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
10. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
11. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09
(1976).
Native American tribal courts serve as another example of a type of court system that
operates in the United States outside of state and national government judicial systems.
The tribal courts are not analogous to ecclesiastical courts, however, because Indian tribes
are "'a separate people' " who retain "'inherent powers of a limited sovereignty which
has never been extinguished.'" United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 321 (1978)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 122 (1945)).
In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Supreme Court held that "(the
Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community, occupying its own territory... in which
the laws of Georgia can have no force.. . ." Id. at 560. To extend such sovereignty to
a religious group would violate the First Amendment's Establishment Clause, which
applies to both the federal government and the states under Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Id. at 15. Even with respect to the Indian tribes, however,
the federal government can restrict the bounds of tribal sovereignty. Allison M. Dussias,
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In tension with this promise of religious freedom to all religious
groups is an equally powerful promise of religious liberty to
individuals. Individuals can choose to violate religious doctrine,
change their religious affiliation, or abandon religion entirely.12
Conflicts between religious groups and their individual members,
or between opposing factions of religious groups, often create a
situation in which the religious freedom of one party must yield
to the religious freedom of the other. 3 On the other hand,
individuals may choose to submit to religious authority and even
seek religious adjudication of matters ordinarily subject to civil
court resolution. 4 Religious tribunals sometimes adjudicate
matters involving parties who may not have submitted to
ecclesiastical authority willingly, however. 5 Furthermore,
granting excessive authority to religious leaders can compromise
the interests of the secular government."
Note, Tribal Court Jurisdiction over Civil Disputes Involving Non-Indians, 20 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 217,221-22 (1986). For example, federal law prohibits tribal governments from
violating rights protected by the United States Constitution. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
Indian tribes' limited sovereignty does not provide Native American religions with
greater insulation from secular interference than other religious societies enjoy. See
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (upholding an Oregon law prohibiting
intentional possession of a controlled substance even when the controlled substance,
peyote, was ingested for sacramental purposes within the context of religious observance
by members of the Native American Church). Similarly, the Mormon Church, despite
its members' efforts to avoid the authority of the United States, is subject to both state
and federal regulation to the same extent as other religious groups. See, e.g., Davis v.
Beason, 133 U.S. 333,348 (1890)(upholding a law ofIdaho Territory prohibitingmembers
of the Mormon Church from registering to vote because the Church advocated polygamy
in violation of territorial law). The specific holding, but not the reasoning, of Davis v.
Beason was effectively overruled in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), which ruled
that religious tests for public office are unconstitutional. Id. at 496. Nevertheless, Davis
remains valid insofar as it stands for the proposition that the Mormons must obey state
as well as federal law even where the laws infringe upon Mormon religious practices.
See id. at 492 n.7 (citing Davis as one of the major cases explicating the history, scope,
and meaning of the First Amendment's religious freedom guarantee).
12. Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 776 (Okla. 1989); see also Everson,
330 U.S. at 15-16.
13. See, e.g., Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 712-13 (determining whether a hierarchical
church can defrock a bishop arbitrarily); Guinn, 775 P.2d at 777 (determining whether
a congregational church can institute disciplinary proceedings against a person who
already has withdrawn from church membership).
14. E.g., Blue Spot, Inc. v. Superior Merchandise Elec. Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788
(App. Div. 1989); Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 439, 443 (Sup. Ct.
1970); Katz v. Uvegi, 187 N.Y.S.2d 511,514 (Sup. Ct. 1959), affd, 205 N.Y.S.2d 972 (App.
Div. 1960).
15. In Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602,605-06 (Sup. Ct. 1980), affd mem., 444
N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 1981), for example, the respondents argued that their submission
to rabbinical court authority was made under duress.
16. See infra part II.A.
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This Note considers the standard of deference that civil courts
should apply in cases where a religious judicatory already has
decided an issue which subsequently is submitted for civil court
resolution."7 It proposes a framework designed to protect the
rights of religious groups to preserve their cultural integrity
while also protecting individuals' personal liberty and the
interests of the secular state. The analysis is necessarily framed
by the opposing demands of the First Amendment's religion
clauses.'" The Free Exercise Clause prohibits civil courts from
intruding into religious societies' internal affLairs, 9 and the
Establishment Clause limits religious authority over secular
issues. 20 To meet the requirements of both religion clauses, civil
courts must refuse to rule on wholly internal, wholly religious
issues, but must defend parties' secular rights.
Part I of this Note considers the standard of deference that
civil courts should apply when they are asked to review
ecclesiastical adjudications of wholly religious disputes. Part L.A
recognizes that civil courts lack authority to resolve ecclesiastical
questions, and that civil courts therefore must defer to religious
decision makers' judgments on these questions. When the civil
adjudication of a secular right depends upon the resolution of
an ecclesiastical dispute, the civil court must accept as binding
the decree of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal that will hear
the dispute. Part' I.B observes, however, that the First
Amendment protects only religious decisions. Thus, when a
religious tribunal acts fraudulently by resolving a religious
dispute in bad faith for secular purposes, the civil court must
have the power to intervene. Part I concludes by arguing that,
because the First Amendment prohibits secular authorities
from entangling themselves in religious societies' internal
17. This Note defines the term "religious court" broadly to include any authoritative
individual or religious body which resolves ecclesiastical controversies. The secular
enforceability of religious judgments can appear unpredictable to religious leaders, who
may have difficulty understanding why some religious adjudications are enforced while
others are reversed or simply ignored. This Note attempts to devise a framework which
will provide predictability for religious authorities and practicability for secular jurists.
18. The Supreme Court has noted that if the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses were each taken to their logical extremes, they would "tend to clash" with each
other. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664,668-69 (1970); see also Jesse H. Choper, The
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITr. L. REV.
673, 673-75 (1980) (discussing the tensions that exist between the two clauses).
19. E.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-50 (1969).
20. E.g., Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 776-79 (Okla. 1989).
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affairs, civil courts can provide only secular remedies for
ecclesiastical fraud and cannot provide religious remedies.
Part II of this Note considers the standard of deference that
civil courts should apply in reviewing religious adjudications of
secular issues. It begins with the premise that the First Amend-
ment protects disputants from having the outcome of their
secular disputes dictated by religious authorities. In a case in
which both parties wish to submit a secular dispute to an
ecclesiastical court for adjudication, however, the ecclesiastical
court may have power to decide the case.
This Part also addresses the issue of the circumstances under
which a religious authority's adjudication of a secular law claim
would be binding upon the civil courts. Part II.A discusses the
doctrine of waiver and concludes that, within the limits imposed
by the public interest in preventing religious organizations from
gaining excessive power over the secular realm, the parties to
a secular dispute can waive their constitutional right to have
their secular claim resolved by secular authorities. Part II.A.1
discusses the public policy concerns which restrict the enforceabil-
ity of a party's plenary waiver of her First Amendment religious
freedoms, and II.A.2 argues that, to the extent that such waivers
do not conflict with public policy, courts should enforce parties'
waivers of their religious freedoms.
Part II.B considers three ways in which the parties might
indicate their wish to waive their First Amendment rights and
submit their dispute to ecclesiastical adjudication. Part II.B.1
considers the adequacy of a party's maintenance of membership
in a religious organization as evidence of a waiver and concludes
that membership in a religious organization is an insufficient
basis for determining that a party has waived his constitutional
right to a hearing in a secular court. Part II.B.2 considers the
adequacy of actual participation in an ecclesiastical court
proceeding as evidence of a waiver and concludes that even actual
participation in a religious court proceeding is not by itself
sufficient to demonstrate that a party has waived his right to
have a secular court resolve a secular issue. It further concludes
that even if a religious authority has already decided a secular
issue, the secular court, upon hearing the case, must apply a
standard of de novo review. Part II.B.3 considers the adequacy
of a binding arbitration agreement as evidence that a party has
waived his right to have a secular court decide his case. It con-
cludes that a properly formulated written agreement to have
religious functionaries arbitrate a secular dispute should be
Ecclesiastical Judgments 959
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treated like any arbitration agreement involving secular
arbitrators; if the religious agents perform the arbitration
according to statutory arbitration provisions, the ecclesiastical
decision should have binding legal force.
Finally, Part III of this Note argues that subordinate bodies
of religious denominations have religious freedoms under the
First Amendment just as individuals and denominations do. This
Part argues that, like individuals, independent congregations
which choose to unite with religious denominations should be
free to separate from those denominations without losing the
property rights that they enjoyed prior to affiliation with the
higher church. This Part thus advocates the neutral principles
approach to resolving religious property disputes rather than the
polity approach. This Part recognizes that congregations can
waive their property rights and other freedoms voluntarily, and
argues that the public policy concerns which constrict the
enforceability of individuals' waivers of their First Amendment
rights do not apply in the context of congregations. It therefore
concludes that such waivers by congregations should be strictly
enforced.
I. CIVIL COURT REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS DECISIONS
INVOLVING PURELY ECCLESIASTICAL SUBJECT MALTERS
The First Amendment's religion clauses prohibit civil
authorities from resolving religious controversies. If secular
authorities were to step into the spiritual realm, religious
societies would lose their freedom to develop their own systems
of belief, and we would risk the possibility that our religious
groups would become arms of the state. This Part develops the
proposition that only religious courts can resolve religious
controversies, and that civil courts must therefore defer to the
judgment of ecclesiastical tribunals when a religious matter is
in controversy. Examples of "purely religious" subjects requiring
deference from civil courts include matters of "theological
controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the
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conformity of the members of the church to the standard of
morals required of them."2 This Part also argues, however, that
21. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871). Before Employment Div.
v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the law was that when the subject matter of the case in-
volved an area in which the state or federal government had acted, secular law would
take precedence if the state showed that a limitation on religious liberty was essential
to the accomplishment of a compelling governmental interest. United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252,257 (1982); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding
that laws against polygamy do not violate the free exercise of religion, even if polygamy
is considered a religiously affiliated duty by Mormons); Frolickstein v. Mayor of Mobile,
40 Ala. 725, 728 (1867) (holding a municipal ordinance, prohibiting the sale of goods by
merchants on Sundays was not violative of the state constitution, as applied to religious
Jews); Hill v. State, 88 So. 2d 880, 885 (Ala. Ct. App.) (holding that, although snake
handling is a ritual in some religions, a statute prohibiting any person from using danger-
ous snakes in a manner as to endanger another person did not violate federal or state
constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion), cert. denied, 88 So. 2d 887 (1956); Hames
v. Hames, 316 A.2d 379,383 (Conn. 1972) (holding that a priest's attempts to "revalidate"
a previous legal divorce were "inconsequential" because any other holding would put
the court in a "position of supplanting state power with ecclesiastical power'); Gay Rights
Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a
religiously affiliated university could not deny tangible benefits to homosexual student
groups); Lawson v. Commonwealth, 164 S.W.2d 972, 973 (Ky. 1942) (holding that a statute
prohibiting snake handling in connection with religious services was a valid exercise
of the state's police power); Harden v. State, 216 S.W.2d 708, 710-11 (Tenn. 1948)
(upholding constitutionality of statute prohibiting snake handling in a manner endanger-
ing another person by finding that although snake handling is a ritual in some religions
and the freedom to believe is absolute, the freedom to act is subject to regulation). Smith
repudiated the strict scrutiny standard. See 494 U.S. at 885-89 (holding that generally
applicable criminal statutes are not subject to strict scrutiny even if they burden religious
practice). Even after Smith, however, the secular law does not overturn the religious
ruling of law, or challenge the validity of the religious group's beliefs, but only regulates
the conduct of the religious group's members. See id. at 887 (finding that 'courts must
not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility
of a religious claim") (citations omitted); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04
(1940). But cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333,341-42 (1890) (arguing that "[t]o call [the
Mormon] advocacy [ofpolygamy] a tenet of religion is to offend the common sense of man-
kind").
The distinction between "religious" and "secular" subject matter or activities is often
unclear. In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987), the
Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling prohibiting the Mormon Church from
imposing religious requirements upon its employees who worked at a Church-run,
nonprofit gymnasium which was open to the public. The Supreme Court held that the
religious exception to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1988)), did not violate the Establishment Clause, at
least as the exception applied to the religious group's nonprofit activities. 483 U.S. at
329-30. The Court assumed in dictum that the Free Exercise Clause did not require
Congress to exempt religious organizations from Title VII with regard to the religious
groups' employment of individuals to perform nonreligious functions. Id. at 335-36.
The Court recognized that a broad exception was constitutionally permissible, however,
holding that, "as applied to the nonprofit activities of religious employers, [the religious
exemption] is rationally related to the legitimate purpose of alleviating significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and carry
out their religious missions." Id. at 339. The Court recognized:
Ecclesiastical Judgments
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[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of
substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider
religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might under-
standably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and
sense of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization
carried out what it understood to be its religious mission.
Id. at 336 (footnote omitted).
The Court did not determine whether the religious exemption could also apply to a
religious organization's for-profit activities. Id. at 349 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In
future cases, the Court will need to recognize that certain for-profit religious activities
could not be carried out if employers were obligated to adhere both to religious law and
to secular antidiscrimination law. Jewish law, for example, prohibits habitual sinners
from receiving authorization to serve as a kosher butcher, a position which is considered
to be a role of authority over the rest of the community. See Eliezer Finkelman,
Homosexuality in Jewish Law, 1 J. SOC'Y RABBIS ACADEMIA 37,40-41 (1991). Although
the preparation and sale of kosher meat is a for-profit activity, the Jewish community
must be free to determine for itself who is and is not qualified to engage in this activity.
See United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues, 211 N.E.2d 332, 334-35
(Mass. 1965) (declining to intervene in a controversy over the interpretation and
enforcement of kashruth in Boston, as the issue is exclusively one of"religious practice
and conscience").
On the other hand, some activities which may at first glance appear to be religious
may actually be secular in nature. See Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1981) (holding that the acquisition of a Jewish certificate of divorce
is not a religious act); J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and
Possible Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REV. 201,208-15 (1984) (arguing that
the Jewish divorce decree is not religious in nature and therefore should be recognized
by a secular court as a mutual agreement to abandon one another).
Lower courts have found that a religious society's activities or facilities sometimes
have a hybrid religious/secular character. In Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Center
& Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), an association of gay Catholics asserted
that the Newman Center's refusal to renew their organization's lease of space within
the Center's building because of their group's views on homosexuality violated the
Minneapolis Civil Rights Ordinance. Id. at 356. The Newman Center and the other
defendants (the Roman Catholic Archdiocese and its Archbishop) asserted that the
application ofthe antidiscrimination law to the Newman Center's rental activities violated
the defendants' free exercise rights. Id. Holding for the defendants, the court ruled that,
to determine whether the rental of property which had a "dual religious/secular nature,"
id. at 357, was subject to secular antidiscrimination law, the court would look to the "form
of the relationship" between the lessor and the lessee. Id. The court held that the
relationship between Dignity and the Newman Center was "clearly religious," and
therefore concluded that the application of the Civil Rights Ordinance in this situation
would create an excessive government entanglement in religious affairs. Id. The court
thus overturned the Minneapolis Commission on Civil Rights' ruling that the ordinance,
while not applying to the religious facilities within the Newman Center, would be enforce-
able with regard to the Center's secular functions. Id. The appellate court's logic in
Dignity is disturbing, however, in that it suggests that the Minneapolis Civil Rights
Ordinance, although not enforceable to require the Newman Center to lease space to
gay Catholics, would be enforceable to require the Center to lease to gay Protestant or
Jewish organizations, which presumably would lack a religious connection with the
Center. Thus, the court appears to have interpreted the ordinance in a manner which
withholds a benefit from members of one faith while providing that benefit to members
of other religious groups.
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religious court decisions influenced by fraud or collusion are not
entitled to First Amendment protection, and therefore are not
entitled to deference from civil authorities.
A. The Need for Civil Courts to Defer to Ecclesiastical
Rulings on Religious Issues
Civil courts have been called upon to enjoin anticipated religious
disciplinary proceedings, 22 to overturn excommunications,23 and
to determine whether a claimant has a right to assume or to
Gay Rights Coalition also involved the application of a municipal antidiscrimination
ordinance to a defendant with a dual religious/secular character, in this case an
educational institution which provided its students with a secular education informed
by Roman Catholic values and traditions. 536 A.2d at 5-8. The plaintiffs, two gay
student organizations, asserted that Georgetown University's refusal to grant official
"University Recognition" to their groups and to supply their organizations with the
tangible benefits (such as a mailbox and University mailing services, id. at 10) that came
with recognition violated the District of Columbia Human Rights Act. Id. at 4. The
University asserted that the Free Exercise Clause exempted it from the Human Rights
Act's requirements. Id. at 30. Unlike the Dignity court, the Gay Rights Coalition court
determined that, although enforcement of the ordinance would infringe upon the
defendant's free exercise rights, the city had a compelling interest in ending sexual
orientation discrimination and held thatthis governmental interest outweighed the minor
burden imposed upon the defendant in this case. Id. at 31-39. The court concluded that
enforcement of the ordinance was the least restrictive means available for achieving the
government's purpose and therefore held that the ordinance would be enforced against
the defendant. Significantly, however, the court held that the Human Rights Act did
not require that official "University Recognition" be provided to the student groups, but
only required the University to supply the groups with the tangible benefits that accom-
pany recognition. Id. at 39.
If the burden on the defendant's free exercise of religion had been more substantial,
for example, by requiring the University to endorse gay student organizations-
"University Recognition" at Georgetown included a religiously based endorsement-rather
than merely provide them with tangible benefits, the balance between the governmental
and religious interests in this case might have been different. See id. at 38. The Supreme
Cout's subsequent decision in Employment Division v. Smith suggests that the Human
Rights Act would apply to the University, even if the Act had not been adopted in further-
ance of a compelling governmental interest, because the Free Exercise Clause alone does
not protect religious groups from the application of neutral, generally applicable laws.
494 U.S. at 881. Even after Smith, however, the University most likely would not be
obligated to endorse its gay students' organizations because the Free Exercise Clause,
coupled with a freedom of speech claim, would protect the University from being forced
to engage in speech offensive to Georgetown's religious mission. See id. at 881-82.
22. See, eg., Grunwald v. Bornfreund, 696 F. Supp. 838,839 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (deciding
action seeking to enjoin the Central Rabbinical Congress of the United States and Canada
from excommunicating plaintiff).
23. See, e.g., Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 42 So. 2d 617, 618
(Ala. 1949) (deciding action seeking reinstatement of plaintiffs as members and officers
of the Church).
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maintain an ecclesiastical title.2' Where there is no issue of fraud
or collusion on the part of the religious tribunal, however, civil
courts must refuse to intervene in such cases. The Free Exercise
Clause bars civil courts from overturning religious determinations
regarding religious issues, and the Establishment Clause
prohibits civil courts from enforcing most religious decrees.
Civil courts not only lack authority to resolve religious conflicts,
but they are also incompetent to do so. 25 Just as the study of
secular law is a lifelong pursuit, many religious groups have their
own systems of laws and traditions, which are so complex that
they can be mastered only through years of study.26 In a nation
with numerous religious groups, the civil courts cannot achieve
the competence to resolve the many disputes that arise in
religious societies whose spiritual missions may be beyond the
24. E.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1976)
(deciding action seeking to enjoin administrator of the diocese from interfering with
diocesan assets of plaintiff and seeking to declare plaintiff as the true diocesan bishop);
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929) (deciding action seeking to
direct the archbishop to appoint plaintiff to a chaplaincy and to pay him the income
accrued during the position's vacancy).
25. Cf. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (finding civil courts less
competent in ecclesiastical law than religious courts); Morris St. Baptist Church v. Dart,
45 S.E. 753, 754 (S.C. 1903) ("To assume such jurisdiction would not only be an attempt
by the civil courts to deal with matters of which they have no special knowledge, but
it would be inconsistent with complete religious liberty, untrammeled by state authority.");
JAMES MADISON, To the Honorable General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Virginia:
A Memorial and Remonstrance, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55,57 (Robert
S. Alley ed., 1985).
26. The Court in Watson reasoned:
Nor do we see that justice would be likely to be promoted by submitting [religious]
decisions to review in [secular] judicial tribunals. Each of these large and
influential bodies (to mention no others, let reference be had to the Protestant
Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal, and the Presbyterian churches), has a body
of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own, to be found in their written
organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of precedents, in their
usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical law and
religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become familiar with. It is not to
be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the
ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each
are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more
learned tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.
80 U.S. at 729. Watson was a diversity case decided according to principles of federal
common law before the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938), and before the application of the First Amendment's religion clauses to
the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,303-04 (1940), and Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947). Nevertheless, the Court has accorded constitutional
significance to much of the Watson Court's holding. See Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-48 (1969).
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comprehension of secular tribunals. Secular courts that base
their opinions on religious doctrine risk misunderstanding the
theological issues involved and may arrive at results that are
theologically unsound.27 Moreover, civil courts that decide
religious issues risk becoming entangled in religious groups'
internal affairs,' with the possibility that they inadvertently will
violate the Free Exercise Clause either by altering or invalidating
religious doctrine,2 9 or by preventing doctrine from developing
and changing.3 °
While the Supreme Court has long recognized the impropriety
of allowing secular courts to answer religious questions, the
Court's decision in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop3 held
open the possibility that civil courts might overturn religious
court decisions in highly unusual circumstances. In Gonzalez,
the Court held that the civil courts cannot inquire into the
validity of a religious organization's internal decisions, but, in
dictum, the Court limited the scope of its holding to include only
cases in which the ecclesiastical decision showed no signs of
27. See Zimbler v. Felber, 445 N.Y.S.2d 366, 370-72 (Sup. Ct. 1981) (criticizing
Kupperman v. Congregation Nusach Sfard, 240 N.Y.S.2d 315 (Sup. Ct. 1963)). Seegener-
ally Bleich, supra note 21, at 215-22 (cataloguing cases in which the civil courts have
misunderstood the nature of a get, a Jewish certificate of divorce).
28. E.g., Congregation Beth Yitzhok v. Briskman, 566 F. Supp. 555,558 (E.D.N.Y.
1983) (refusing to resolve a dispute for lack of justiciability when resolution of the legal
issues would also require the court to determine who is the rightful successor to a
deceased religious leader).
29. E.g., Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc., 819 F.2d 875,881 (9th Cir.)
(refusing to impose tort liability on Jehovah's Witnesses who shunned a disassociated
member of the Church because such liability would "have the same effect of prohibiting
the practice and would compel the Church to abandon part of its religious teachings"),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); Mitchell v. Albanian Orthodox Diocese in Am., Inc.,
244 N.E.2d 276,280 (Mass. 1969) (Kirk, J., dissenting) (opposing the majority's decision
ordering an ordained clergyman to comply with a religious corporation's by-laws relating
to the selection of a bishop because the order "constitutes interference in a controversy
which is essentially ecclesiastical in nature").
30. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969) (repudiating the "departure-from-doctrine" standard as a
tool for resolving religious property disputes); see also Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775
P.2d 766,772 (Okla. 1989) (holding thatjudicialinterference with legislatively mandated
religious freedoms is only proper when there is a clear and present danger of disorder
or when there is any other immediate threat to public safety).
Of course, civil courts face the same risk of error when they apply voluntary
associations' by-laws to resolve those organizations' internal disputes. The First
Amendment requires, however, that the possibility of error be minimized where religious
organizations-are involved. Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches
as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 335, 346 (1986). For a criticism
of the distinct judicial treatment of religious societies! internal disputes, see CARL ZOLLMAN,
AMERICAN CHURCH LAW §§ 296-310 (1933).
31. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
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"fraud, collusion or arbitrariness."32 When a case apparently
involving arbitrariness actually reached the Supreme Court,
however, the Court eliminated the arbitrariness exception.
In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,33 the
Court defined an "arbitrary" decision as a decision in which a
religious tribunal has decided a case without complying with its
own laws and regulations.34 The Court explained that "arbitrary"
decisions were not subject to civil court review because
it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions
are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith
whether or not rational or measurable by objective criteria.
Constitutional concepts of due process involving secular
notions of "fundamental fairness" or impermissible objectives,
are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical
35cognizance.
Milivojevich should be understood to prohibit civil courts from
reviewing religious court determinations with regard both to the
religious tribunal's adherence to substantive ecclesiastical law
and to ecclesiastical judicial and administrative procedure.
Plaintiffs have asserted on various occasions that they were
entitled under religious law to have a hearing or other proceeding
before being disciplined or otherwise affected by a religious
judgment.3 ' The argument has been made that arbitrary changes
in religious groups' practices defeat the reasonable expectations
of the religious groups' members.37 This argument rests on a
contractual theory of the relationship between religious societies
and their members and proposes that people who join a religious
group do so in reliance upon the information they have about
the group's beliefs and practices.38 Thus, plaintiffs have argued
that their religious organizations should not be allowed to
32. Id. at 16.
33. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
34. Id. at 712-13.
35. Id. at 714-15 (footnote omitted).
36. E.g., Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444,445-46 (W.D. Va.), affd mem., 661 F.2d
925(4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1246 (1982); Brown v. Mt. Olive Baptist Church,
124 N.W.2d 445, 446-47 (Iowa 1963).
37. See generally Kent S. Bernard, Churches, Members, and the Role of the Courts:
Toward a Contractual Analysis, 51 NOTRE DAME LAW. 545, 550 (1976).
38. See generally id. at 547-52.
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discipline them using procedures which are arbitrary or
inconsistent with due process of ecclesiastical law.39
Secular courts, however, are not an appropriate forum for
resolution of religious rights. Only a religious decision maker
can determine what a party's rights are and remedy any viola-
tions that may have occurred. A party who is dissatisfied with
the process provided by the religious society can express her
dissatisfaction through whatever channels the society itself
provides 4° or can leave the religious group altogether. For many
people, the choice to abandon the group can be an extremely
painful one, 41 and a person who leaves his religious group, by
choice or through excommunication, may also have to sever well-
developed social connections42 and even business ties,43 but
leaving the group can lead to religious reform as well. Religious
leaders may pay little attention when only a few adherents
choose to abandon their group, but when large numbers of people
do so, leaders often respond by working to make their groups
more attractive.' This type of pressure is the type which is most
39. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 698 (1976);
Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355,357(8th Cir. 1983); Nunn, 506 F. Supp. at 445-46;
Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 42 So. 2d 617, 618 (Ala. 1949); Baugh
v. Thomas, 265 A.2d 675, 676 (N.J. 1970); Morris St. Baptist Church v. Dart, 45 S.E.
753, 755 (S.C. 1903).
40. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871).
41. Cf. Baugh v. Thomas, 265 A.2d 675,677 (N.J. 1970) ("We believe that expulsion
from a church or other religious organization can constitute a serious emotional
deprivation which, when compared to some losses of property or contract rights, can be
far more damaging to an individual.").
42. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc., 819 F.2d 875,876-77 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987).
43. See Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105, 106 (Pa. 1975).
44. American religious groups are free to innovate or regress to whatever extent
the market will bear. Thus, they compete in a laissez-faire free market of religious ideas.
For a description of the factors influencing this market's fluctuations in supply and
demand, see generally Kenneth L. Woodward et al., A Time to Seek, NEWSWEEK, Dec.
17, 1990, at 50, 50-56.
Although a system of religious freedom based on a notion of freedom to choose one's
beliefs enables religious societies and individuals to allow their beliefs to evolve over
time, this type of system does not recognize that religious beliefs are often based on the
dictates of conscience rather than on choice. The notion that people can choose a religion
is rooted in the theological rhetoric of a segment of the ancient Jewish population and
of the early and medieval Christians, and contrasts sharply with the views of
groups-including most modern Jews-which see religion as an inalienable heritage one
receives upon being born into one's family, tribe, or nation. John E. Boswell, Jews, Bicycle
Riders, and Gay People: The Determination of Social Consensus and Its Impact on
Minorities, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 205, 221, 225 (1989).
Choice-based First Amendment jurisprudence sometimes fails to accommodate religious
obligations which arguably could be accommodated without breaching the wall of
separation between church and state. This jurisprudence also sometimes fails to
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appropriate for keeping religious leaders from trampling on
religious rights. Any role that the civil courts might play would
only further destroy religious freedom.'
In deferring to religious court decisions regarding purely
religious issues, civil courts should show equal respect to the
decisions rendered by the tribunals of both hierarchical and
congregational religious societies. It has been suggested that
congregational religious tribunals must adhere more closely to
notions of due process and fundamental fairness than must
appreciate the religious nature of certain symbols and holidays. For a critique of the
choice-basedAmericanapproachtoguaranteeingreligiousfreedom, seegeneralyMichael
J. Sandel, Freedom of Conscience or Freedom of Choice?, in ARTICLES OF FAITH, ARTICLES
OF PEACE THE RELIGIOUS LMEMrY CLAUSES AND THE AMERCAN PUBLIC PHEUDSPHY 74 (James
D. Hunter & Os Guinness eds., 1990).
James Madison recognized that religious beliefs are matters of conviction, see, MADISON,
supra note 25, at 56, but nevertheless advocated competition among sects as a way of
promoting both freedom of conscience and governmental independence from religious
authority. Madison argued that multiplicity of sects, without State establishment of
any, would promote clerical responsiveness to congregants' needs, and minimize the
persecution of religious dissenters. Large religious organizations would command greater
respect if they could show that they had achieved their broad appeal without State
support and in spite of the free proliferation of smaller sects. Id. at 57-59. A free,
competitive atmosphere would also protect smaller denominations against persecution,
since these denominations would be so numerous that, in aggregate, they would have
the power to prevent the larger sects from acquiring sufficient power to become oppres-
sive. This actual power, Madison argued, would be a greater protection of universal
religious freedom than any apparent protection that might be written in a proposed Bill
of Rights. JAMES MADISON, Defense of the Constitution: Virginia Ratification Convention
June 12, 1788, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 25, at 71; see also
ROBERT J. MORGAN, JAMES MADISON ON THE CONSTITUTION AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 131-32
(1988). Finally, competition among sects, as reflected in the lack of any established State
Church, would promote respect for the secular government and its laws by minimizing
the resentment that members of minority sects might feel if the State compelled them
to support the dominant sect. See MADISON, supra note 25, at 59. For a comparison of
James Madison's view with the views of Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams, see
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-3, at 1158-59 (2d ed. 1988).
45. Removingboth substantive and procedural issues of ecclesiastical jurisprudence
from secular court authority also spares civil courts the difficulty of distinguishing
substantive issues from procedural issues. The purpose of removing these issues from
the secular realm is not to save secular courts from making difficult decisions, however,
but rather to protect religious interests from secular intrusion. See Jones v. Wolf, 443
U.S. 595, 613 n.2 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The secular court's interest in preserving the fundamental fairness of religious
proceedings is greater in a country such as Israel, in which religious courts have authority
over secular matters, such as issues surrounding marriage and family. E.g., Rabbinical
Courts Jurisdiction (Marriage and Divorce) Law, 5713/1953, No. 64, reprinted in 7 LAWS
OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 139 (5713/1952-53). Under a system which obligates people to obey
religious decrees, the religious tribunals are state actors, and the state must accept
responsibility for any abuses these tribunals may commit.
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hierarchical religious authorities.' Arguably, hierarchical
religions, which might allow parties to appeal unfavorable
decisions to higher authorities which are detached from the
parties' dispute, provide a more objective, more just forum for
resolving disputes than any congregational judiciary might afford.
Constitutionally, however, the Establishment Clause requirement
that government not prefer some religious groups over others47
must be understood to prohibit civil courts from extending greater
deference toward hierarchical religious authorities than toward
congregational tribunals.'
Deference to ecclesiasticaljudgments becomes improper where
a secular right is at stake, however. In cases where religious
and secular rights are linked, civil courts must strive to protect
the endangered secular rights without intruding into the religious
realm. Civil courts commonly face this task when a congregation
fires a cleric, and the cleric disputes the validity of the dis-
missal.49 The freedom to employ or dismiss a religious leader
46. See First Baptist Church v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 681-82 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(citing Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 140 (1872)).
47. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228,244 (1982); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S.
1, 15 (1947).
48. First Baptist Church, 591 F. Supp. at 682 ("[B]ecause the 'hands off' policy
espoused by the [Milivojevich] Court is of constitutional dimension, we find it difficult
to justify the application of a different standard where a congregational church is
involved."). In Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court stated:
[W]e are of the opinion that a church's disciplinary decisions are protected from
judicial scrutiny whether the church is 'congregational' or 'hierarchical.' ...
Disciplinary decisions made by [congregational churches] are no less fair or
deserving of judicial deference than decisions made by churches structured in a
hierarchical fashion. The lack of a congregation's own 'religious' court of appeals
is not justification for the intervention and review by a civil tribunal.
Id. at 772 n.18.
49. Excommunications give rise to another class of cases in which civil courts must
protect secular rights without infringing on religious ones. Typical excommunications
are purely religious in nature and therefore immune from civil court review. See, e.g.,
Guinn, 775 P.2d at 771 n.18; Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc., 819 F.2d 875,
883 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 926 (1987); Brown v. Mt. Olive Baptist Church, 124
N.W.2d 445, 446 (Iowa 1963); cf. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 177 (1944)
(Jackson, J., dissenting) ("Religious activities which concern only members of the faith
are and ought to be free-as nearly absolutely free as anything can be."). But cf. Baugh
v. Thomas, 265 A.2d 675, 677 (N.J. 1970) ("The loss of the opportunity to worship in
familiar surroundings is a valuable right which deserves the protection of the law where
no constitutional barrier exists."). See generally T.W. Cousens, Annotation, Suspension
or Expulsion from Church or Religious Society and the Remedies Therefor, 20 A.L.R.2d
421,429-32 (1951).
Bear v. Reformed Mennonite Church, 341 A.2d 105 (Pa. 1975), exemplifies the task
civil courts face in resolving excommunication cases when secular issues do arise. Bear
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is a constitutionally protected freedom under the Free Exercise
Clause.5' Civil courts, therefore, cannot force a congregation to
allow a cleric to complete the term of his contract or require that
the congregation provide appropriate internal proceedings before
terminating the contract.
Appropriately, however, civil courts have investigated the issue
of whether the body which dismissed the cleric had authority
to do so.51 The court may be able to determine without overstep-
ping its bounds that a congregation could oust its leader only
upon majority vote of the members, or that only the congrega-
tion's board of trustees could dismiss the cleric. Where such
determinations can be made in a constitutionally permissible
involved a plaintiff who, because of the Mennonite practice of "shunning," suffered the
collapse of his business, marriage, and family. Even his wife and children refused to
speak to him. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded for a determination of
whether the shunning in this case was so severe as to constitute "an excessive interference
within areas of 'paramount state concern,' i.e., the maintenance of marriage and family
relationship, alienation of affection, and the tortious interference with a business
relationship," such that the Free Exercise Clause could not serve as a defense. Id. at
107; see also O'Neil v. Schuckardt, 733 P.2d 693,700 (Idaho 1986) (upholding husband's
cause of action for invasion of privacy when members of his wife's religious group urged
her to cease living with her husband as his wife); Carrieri v. Bush, 419 P.2d 132, 137
(Wash. 1966) (upholding a husband's cause of action for alienation of affections after
his wife joined a church whose pastor urged her to leave her marriage and ruling that
.one does not, under the guise of exercising religious beliefs, acquire a license to
wrongfully interfere with familial relationships"); Justin K Miller, Comment, Damned
If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Religious Shunning and the Free Exercise Clause, 137
U. PA_ L. REV. 271, 273-74 (1988) (arguing that absolute constitutional protection for
shunning is inappropriate).
50. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); see also Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Miivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,717-20 (1976) (holdingthat civil courts
must defer to the decision of a hierarchical church's highest tribunal concerning the
suspension and removal of a church bishop); Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d
490,494 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that civil courts are prohibited by the First Amendment
from hearing a plaintiffs claim for damages resulting from his removal as pastor of a
congregation).
51. E.g., Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 422 N.E.2d 1337, 1341-44 (Mass. 1981);
Holt v. Trone, 67 N.W.2d 125,127 (Mich. 1954); Vincent v. Raglin, 318 N.W.2d 629,631
(Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Walker Memorial Baptist Church, Inc. v. Saunders, 35 N.E.2d
42,44 (N.Y. 1941); Tate v. Walker Memorial Baptist Church, 122 N.Y.S.2d 182,183 (App.
Div. 1953) (per curiam); see also Zimbler v. Felber, 445 N.Y.S.2d 366, 372-74 (Sup. Ct.
1981) (reviewing the authority of synagogue trustees to nullify a membership vote in
favor of extending their rabbi's contract).
People v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct.), affd mem. per curiam, 28 N.E.2d 717
(N.Y. 1940), extended to the criminal context the concept that courts must verify that
a religious body has authority to make a particular decision. Gordon was found guilty
of violatingNew York's statute forbidding fraudulent sale of nonkosher poultry as kosher
food. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the state, which had relied upon
a religious determination that Gordon's poultry was not kosher, had failed to demonstrate
that the religious decision makers had authority to make such a determination. 16
N.Y.S.2d at 834.
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manner, the court can protect the cleric's secular employment
right, which can be divested only by a body that has authority
to terminate that right. If the dismissal was made by an
appropriate body, however, the civil court must defer to that
body's judgment without further investigation.52 Even when the
dismissal is binding, however, civil courts should have authority
to award damages for breach of contract because this secular
remedy protects the cleric's contract right without interfering
with the congregation's freedom to repudiate the cleric's
authority.53
In some cases, the actions of a religious body may interfere
with its members' secular rights to such an extent as to require
immediate rectification by civil authorities. When the religious
society's abuses become so severe that delay in civil adjudication
would result in irreparable harm to the plaintiffs rights or
overriding state interests, the civil courts have a duty to protect
the endangered interests.' When this threat does not exist,
however, civil courts should refuse to provide relief to the
complaining party until after the plaintiff has exhausted all
internal rights of appeal available within the religious society.55
52. In Morris St. BaptistChurchv. Dart, 45 S.E. 753 (S.C. 1903), the South Carolina
Supreme Court stated:
Therefore, where it is admitted, as in this case, that property belongs to a particular
church, and the only question is whether the defendant claiming to be pastor should
be excluded from its use, this court will only consider whether the church has
ordered his exclusion, not whether it was right in doing so. Neither will the court,
as a civil tribunal, undertake to determine whether the resolution directing
exclusion was passed in accordance with the canon law of the church, except in
so far as may be necessary to do so in determining whether it was in fact the church
that acted.
Id. at 754, quoted in Vincent v. Raglin, 318 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
53. See Dart, 45 S.E. at 756; see also Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490,
494 (5th Cir. 1974) (recognizing that a dismissed pastor may have a breach of contract
action under state law even though he has no cause of action under federal civil rights
statutes or the United States Constitution).
54. Cf. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51,55 (1973) (stating that where a state statute
cannot possibly be interpreted in a manner which would avoid the necessity of consti-
tutional adjudication, federal courts have a "solemn responsibility... to 'guard, enforce,
and protect every right granted or secured by the Constitution'" and therefore cannot
abstain from such adjudication) (quoting Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
55. See First Baptist Church v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983);
Holiman v. Dovers, 366 S.W.2d 197, supp. op. on reh'g, 366 S.W.2d 203, 204 (Ark.
1963).
Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), involved civil court
review of a subordinate authority's decision within a hierarchical church. The Court
did not consider the Archbishop's assertion that the plaintiff's failure to pursue
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This policy maximizes the religious organization's independence
from civil interference and gives the religious society a broad
opportunity to resolve controversial issues in accordance with
their own doctrine and procedures. The decision of the society's
appellate tribunal also may correct the secular injustice that the
plaintiff has suffered, eliminating the need for civil adjudication.'
An abstention policy would also spare religious groups the
indignity of having to explain and justify their actions in civil
court.
While the Free Exercise Clause protects religious societies from
having their resolutions of ecclesiastical controversies overruled
by civil courts, the Establishment Clause prohibits civil courts
from enforcing religious decrees. When a civil court enforces an
ecclesiastical court's orders, the civil court risks violating the
Establishment Clause by putting state authority behind the
religious court's decision.5 7 A civil court's refusal to overturn a
religious determination effectively upholds the validity of that
determination, but withholds the government's enforcement
power. The religious group is left to enforce its own decrees
through whatever social pressure it can use against its members.
Where a secular right is based on a religious issue, however,
the civil court must accept the religious tribunal's determina-
tion and rely upon the religious ruling in adjudicating secular
rights.5 8 For example, a congregation can use appropriate
state agencies to have its former pastor ejected from a
parsonage,5 9 or barred from addressing the congregation from
the pulpit,6" upon showing that the pastor has been dismissed.
This civil court deference to the religious determination is
his Canon-Law right of appeal within the Church barred the plaintiff from initiating
further proceedings, however, because the Court reached its holding in favor of the
Archbishop based on other factors. Id. at 15-16.
56. See Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73,78-79 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that federal
courts must avoid friction with the states by refusing to rule on the constitutionality
of state laws until the state courts have had an opportunity to construe those laws,
possibly in such a way as to eliminate the apparent constitutional problem); Railroad
Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 499-501 (1941) (same).
57. Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
58. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,722-25 (1976); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679,727
(1871).
59. E.g., Simpson v. Wells Lamont Corp., 494 F.2d 490, 494-95 (5th Cir. 1974)
(holding that it is a public official's duty to execute a valid eviction order); Antioch
Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 422 N.E.2d 1337,1344(Mass. 1981)(holdingthatthe enforcement
of an eviction of a former pastor does no more than honor a decision of a church's ruling
body).
60. E.g., Morris St. Baptist Church v. Dart, 45 S.E. 753, 754 (S.C. 1903).
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necessary under the First Amendment's guarantee that civil
courts will not resolve religious questions.6 '
There has been disagreement within the Supreme Court,
however, regarding the question of whether civil courts must give
effect to the decisions of "the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization," 2 or "the highest body within the hierarchy
that has considered the dispute.' Actually, neither of these
positions is exactly right. The correct formulation should be that
civil courts must defer to the highest body within the hierarchy
or congregation that will consider the dispute. Before a civil
court acts in reliance upon a religious tribunal's decision, the civil
court must be certain that the religious courts consider the
matter settled and not subject to rehearing.4 In many cases,
the issues will not be settled until the highest body in the
hierarchy has spoken, or until the matter has passed through
any appellate process a congregational society might have. In
other cases, however, the parties might exhaust their remedies
without reaching the religious group's highest judicial body. The
religious group might conceivably limit the time period within
which appeals can be heard or might allow appeals only when
the superior body agrees to consider the case.' The key issue
is that the matter must be settled from a religious perspective.
Only then can the civil courts act in reliance upon the ecclesiasti-
cal judgment.
B. Marginal Civil Court Review of Ecclesiastical Decisions
Based on Fraud or Collusion
In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, the Supreme
Court found that the Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop
decision's language suggesting that marginal civil court review
might be appropriate when religious decisions were tainted with
61. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602; Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25.
62. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
63. Id. at 619 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
64. See, e.g., First Baptist Church v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983)
(holding that all internal rights to appeal must be exhausted before a civil court may
rely on the ecclesiastical judgment).
65. See Putman v. Vath, 340 So. 2d 26, 27 (Ala. 1976) (stating that the religious
tribunal refused to hear plaintiffs case because the matter was an administrative, and
not a judicial one).
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"fraud, collusion or arbitrariness"' was merely dictum.6 7 The
Court held that arbitrariness actually cannot serve as a basis
for marginal civil court review,' calling into question the status
of fraud or collusion as a basis for such review.69 The Milivojev-
ich Court left this question open.7 ° While the Supreme Court
was correct to disclaim its authority to review arbitrary
ecclesiastical decisions, the Court should retain the authority
to review fraudulent decisions and should elevate the surviving
portion of the Gonzalez dictum to the status of law when an
appropriate case arises.
Both arbitrary decisions and fraudulent or collusive decisions
involve the problem of a religious tribunal's departure from
religious doctrine. A tribunal's actions can be considered
arbitrary when "the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical
tribunal of a hierarchical church [do not] comply with church
laws and regulations."7 The freedom to engage in such
departures from old doctrine and to evolve new doctrine is part
of the religious liberty guaranteed by the First Amendment,
however. 72  The Supreme Court's recognition of its lack of
authority to interfere in this evolutive process ensures that
religious groups will be free to develop their beliefs on their own.
"Fraud" and "collusion," by contrast, occur "when church
66. The Gonzalez opinion stated, "In the absence of fraud, collusion or arbitrariness,
the decisions of the proper Church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,
because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise." Gonzalez v.
Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929).
Like Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), Gonzalez was decided on
nonconstitutional grounds, but has influenced the subsequent development of
constitutional law. See, e.g., Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 447, 449 (1969) (holding that civil courts cannot
determine ecclesiastical questions when resolving property disputes); Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (prohibiting legislative intervention in
religious groups' selection of clergy). The Kedroff Court exemplified this influence by
finding: "Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,
... must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free
exercise of religion against state interference." (footnote omitted).
67. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 712 (1976).
68. Id. at 713.
69. See First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church, 430 F. Supp. 450,
455 (N.D.N.Y. 1977); Thomas W. Cunningham, Note, ConstitutionalLaw-First Amend-
ment-The Role of Civil Courts in Church Disputes, 1977 WIS. L. REV. 904, 922, 927.
70. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
71. Id.
72. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
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tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes." 3 By definition,
"secular purposes" are not within the scope of the First Amend-
ment's protection of religious free exercise. Therefore, the "purely
ecclesiastical"74 character of the dispute is destroyed, and secular
courts have authority to protect the rights which the religious
tribunal attempted to dispose of under the false guise of
ecclesiastical adjudication. Thus, while departures from religious
doctrine are beyond the scope of civil court review when the
departures are "arbitrary," but made in good faith for spiritual
purposes, the Constitution permits secular court review of
departures from doctrine when the departures are fraudulent
or collusive.
The extent of the analysis that civil courts must undertake in
order to find fraud or collusion is also less troubling constitu-
tionally than the analysis necessary to determine that a decision
was made arbitrarily. The Milivojevich Court recognized that
a civil investigation into the issue of whether an ecclesiastical
decision was arbitrary "must inherently entail inquiry into the
procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires
the church judicatory to follow, or else into the substantive
criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical
question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amend-
ment prohibits.... ."7 An investigation into whether a religious
decision was fraudulent, on the other hand, does not require any
investigation into the correctness of the religious tribunal's
decision, but only requires investigation into the decision maker's
motive. Thus, to prove fraud or collusion, a plaintiff need not
necessarily show that the religious tribunal would have reached
a different conclusion if the ecclesiastical dispute had not been
tainted by secular considerations. The plaintiff need only show
that, regardless of the correctness of the tribunal's ultimate
decision, the procedure by which the tribunal reached its decision
involved bad faith on the part of the decision makers.76 A
showing by the defendant that the religious tribunal's decision,
although based in part upon improper considerations, rested
primarily upon legitimate religious concerns might influence the
remedy available to the plaintiff, however. Moreover, as in other
73. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
74. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 733 (1871).
75. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 713.
76. But cf. Miller v. Catholic Diocese, 728 P.2d 794, 797 (Mont. 1986) (holding that
a judicial inquiry into the presence or absence of good faith on the part of a cleric would
violate the Free Exercise Clause).
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cases in which fraud is alleged, the plaintiff will be required to
meet a heightened standard of proof before the plaintiff will be
able to obtain civil relief.
77
United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues78 serves
as an example of a case in which the court might have found
fraud but instead declined to analyze this issue for fear of
interfering in a religious group's internal affairs. Both the
plaintiff and the defendant were involved in the religious activity
of certifying meats and poultry'as kosher.79 The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant had used anticompetitive trade practices to
become the dominant kashruth certification body in the local
market, and in the process had illegally interfered with the
plaintiffs contractual relations and with the plaintiffs ability
to compete in a free market.' Specifically, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant, which certified kosher caterers in the Boston
area, told its clients that they could no longer accept meat from
butchers who were certified by the plaintiffs rabbinical
inspectors, but rather could only accept meat from butchers who
were supervised by the defendant's inspectors."' The court
conceded that "[t]he benefits attaching to a contract or to an
advantageous business relationship are recognized as property
rights and any unjustified interference with their enjoyment is
actionable," 2 but the court refused to provide any relief in this
case because intervention in the dispute would require the court
to resolve questions of religious law.'
77. First Baptist Church v. Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676, 683 (S.D. Ohio 1983). Plaintiffs
in fraud cases must prove their claim by clear and convincing evidence rather than a
mere preponderance of the evidence. E.g., Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385,396 (Colo.
1982) (en banc) (corporate dissolution); Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 682 P.2d 1247,1253 (Idaho
1983) (real estate sales); Hofmann v. Hofmann, 446 N.E.2d 499, 506 (Ill. 1983)
(forfeitures); Nordstrom v. Miller, 605 P.2d 545, 552 (Kan. 1980) (advertising); Butler
v. Poulin, 500 A.2d 257, 260 n.5 (Me. 1985) (real estate sales); Gardner v. Jones, 464
So. 2d 1144, 1149 (Miss. 1985); Winn v. Aleda Constr. Co., Inc., 315 S.E.2d 193,195 (Va.
1984); Lundin v. Shimanski, 368 N.W.2d 676, 681 (Wis. 1985). Contra Wieczoreck v.
H & H Builders, Inc., 475 So. 2d 227, 228 (Fla. 1985).
78. 211 N.E.2d 332 (Mass. 1965).
79. Id. at 333.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
83. The court found:
[W]e would inevitably be faced with such questions as who has the authority to
enforce Kashruth in Boston, what are the criteria for determining whether foods
are kosher, and what procedures must the body in charge of Kashruth follow. All
of these questions are determinable only by reference to Jewish law, a domain into
which the courts will not venture.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Under the definition of fraud subsequently set forth in
Milivojevich,84 however, the court would have been able to resolve
the secular dispute without addressing the religious issues. To
understand the facts of the case fully, the court might have
needed to hear testimony regarding Judaism's dietary laws, but
the court would not have needed to settle any doctrinal disputes.
If some of the testimony was contradictory, the court simply
should have acknowledged that disagreements over doctrine often
arise within evolving religious traditions, and that the existence
of disagreements is no discredit to the opposing religious
authorities, each of whom may hold their divergent views with
conviction. The issue for the court would merely have been
whether the plaintiff had shown sufficient evidence under the
heightened standard of proof applicable to fraud cases to
establish that the defendant's motive in attempting to centralize
kashruth certification under its own authority was entirely or
partially secular rather than religious.
If the plaintiff prevailed on this issue, then the court would
have needed to fashion an appropriate remedy. The court
correctly recognized that it could not compel the defendant and
its clients to accept the plaintiffs guarantee that meats prepared
under the plaintiffs supervision were authentically kosher, as
this remedy would interfere with the freedom of religious groups
to interpret their own laws.' The court might have found it
appropriate to award compensatory damages for lost income from
breached contracts, however, and might also have awarded
punitive damages. Of course, in some cases, a court might
conclude that a plaintiff is not entitled to relief even though the
plaintiff has proven fraud. For example, a court might elect to
deny relief to a plaintiffwhere the defendant's behavior, although
partially motivated by inappropriate secular considerations, was
predominantly motivated by spiritual concerns and had not
actually impaired the plaintiffs interests to any further extent
than those interests would have been impaired in the absence
of fraud.
Katz v. Uvegi,86 a case involving religious arbitration of a
secular business dispute, further illustrates the appropriateness
84. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713 (1976); see also
supra text accompanying note 73.
85. United Kosher Butchers Ass'n, 211 N.E.2d at 334.
86. 187 N.Y.S.2d 511 (Sup. Ct. 1959), affd, 205 N.Y.S.2d 972 (App. Div. 1960).
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of reversing fraudulent decisions.8 7 In Katz, the respondent in
a motion to confirm an award by a religious arbitration panel
alleged facts which, if true, clearly would have established fraud
on the part of the religious arbitrators. These facts included
allegations that the arbitrators met privately with the opposing
party, that the arbitrators were uninterested in hearing the
respondent's case, and even refused to summon one of the
respondent's witnesses even though the witness's testimony was
relevant to the case.' Most significantly, the respondent alleged
that one of the arbitrators had telephoned him prior to the
panel's announcement of its award and told the respondent that,
even though he (the arbitrator) apparently disagreed with the
panel's decision, he planned to sign the decision "because if he
refused he would never be permitted to sit as a judge in future
cases and he needed the income he received from these
proceedings." 9 The Katz court did not reach the fraud issue,
however, because the arbitration was invalid under state law
for procedural reasons.9
Debates preceding the admission of women to the Cantors
Assembly of Judaism's Conservative movement also gave rise
to allegations of fraud, although the issue was resolved without
secular litigation.9' The qualifications of women for the role of
cantor raises questions of Jewish law92 which can be resolved
only by internal religious bodies. Some women alleged, however,
that the men who previously had voted not to admit women to
the Assembly had been motivated by economic concerns created
87. Cf. Cooper v. Weissblatt, 277 N.Y.S. 709 (App. Term. 1935). In Cooper, the
plaintiff proved that one member of the three-rabbi religious panel conspired with the
other party to the religious proceeding, Mr. Nelson, to obtain a fraudulent judgment which
Mr. Nelson later sought to enforce in civil court. Id. at 716. The secular appellate court
affirmed a civil judgment awarding the plaintiff money damages in the amount of the
expenses the plaintiff incurred in defending Mr. Nelson's enforcement action. Id. at
719-20.
88. Katz, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 514.
89. Id. at 515.
90. Id. at 517-18.
91. Litigation did arise, however, after the Jewish Theological Seminary of America
began admitting women to its rabbinical ordination program. See Faur v. Jewish
Theological Seminary, 536 N.Y.S.2d 516 (App. Div. 1989) (mem.), appeal dismissed, 561
N.E.2d 888 (N.Y. 1990). A member of the seminary's faculty resigned in response to
the change in policy and sued the seminary for breach of contract and religious
discrimination. The court found that the seminary had no contractual obligation under
secular law to refrain from changing its policies and held that any finding of culpable
religious discrimination based on a change in religious doctrine would amount to
impermissible secular interference in a wholly religious dispute. Id. at 517.
92. Ari L. Goldman, A Bar to Women as Cantors Is Lifted, N.Y. TBMES, Sept. 19,
1990, at B2.
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by the tight job market for cantors.93 Unlike religious doctrinal
concerns, these economic concerns could not justify a determina-
tion that women are "unqualified" to serve as cantors, and, if
true, should have been held to substantiate an action for fraud. 4
As in United Kosher Butchers, it would have been inappropriate
for a secular court to grant a religious remedy, such as forcing
the Cantors Assembly to accept women, because such a remedy
would interfere in the religious society's internal affairs. A
secular court, however, could offer a secular remedy, such as
money damages. This type of remedy would diminish or remove
the secular advantage that male cantors received by excluding
women, and might thus have led the Cantors Assembly to a more
thoroughly religious determination of whether Jewish law allows
women to serve as cantors. Of course, the Cantors Assembly still
might have ruled that women were unfit for this position, but
the later ruling might have been less likely to be tainted by
impermissible secular considerations. Ultimately, the fraud issue
has become moot in this case, as women are now members of the
Cantors Assembly.95
The secular courts' inability to offer equitable religious
remedies, such as reinstatement of a fired minister, may be
unsatisfactory to the plaintiff who suffered harm as a result of
fraud. The rule proposed here, that secular courts should offer
only secular remedies, offers the advantage, however, of allowing
religious groups to maintain authority over their internal affairs
even when their internal affairs are in a state of disarray, thus
allowing religious doctrine and practice to evolve free from
secular interference. Meanwhile, by focusing the civil court's
attention on the motive underlying an ecclesiastical decision
rather than on the correctness of that decision, the fraud test
remains a potentially valuable, although poorly developed,
analytical tool for remedying the effects of ecclesiastical
intrusions into the secular realm.
93. Id. (reporting that the professional association of cantors had only 400 members).
94. Thus, proof of a "secular purpose" is essential to a claim of religious fraud. See
Kaufmann v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1983) ("[Tlhe proposed amendments
to the complaint deal only with matters of religion and there is no allegation that we
can construe in any other light. Accordingly, we do not here deal with secular purposes
and the 'fraud' or 'collusion' exceptions are unavailable.").
95. Goldman, supra note 92, at B2.
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II. CIL COURT REVIEW OF RELIGIOUS DECISIONS
INVOLVING SECULAR INTERESTS
While civil courts cannot resolve "wholly ecclesiastical" disputes
and must defer to ecclesiastical decisions regarding "wholly
internal" religious issues, the secular courts must retain
jurisdiction over secular issues. Courts would violate the First
Amendment if they required litigants to adhere to ecclesiastical
determinations resolving secular disputes. The Free Exercise
Clause guarantees to each individual the right to decide for
oneself whether to recognize the authority of any religious
functionary," and the Establishment Clause should be under-
stood to prohibit secular courts from granting ecclesiastical bodies
power to decide secular issues.
Parties may choose to waive these First Amendment protec-
tions, however, and obtain a binding adjudication from an
ecclesiastical tribunal. When religious judicatories provide proper
procedural safeguards and do not violate public interest, civil
courts should enforce religious adjudications of secular disputes.
A. The Legality of Waivers of First Amendment Rights
The constitutional guarantee of religious freedom includes the
freedom to abandon one's religious group in favor of another
religion or no religion at all.9 7 Submission of a secular dispute
to a religious body for binding resolution requires that the parties
give up some of their freedom to reject their religious leaders'
authority. Such waivers should be allowed to the extent that
they do not conflict with public policy.
1. Limits on Citizens'Abilities to Waive Their Free Exercise
Rights-Private parties cannot waive their individual statutory
or constitutional rights if such waivers jeopardize public
interests.98 The Supreme Court has ruled, for example, that
employees cannot waive their individual rights under the Fair
96. Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 777 (Okla. 1989).
97. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947); Guinn, 775 P.2d at 776.
98. Office & Professional Employees Intl Union, Local 2 v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 552 F. Supp. 622,631 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem., 713 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
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Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act).9 In Brooklyn Savings
Bank v. O'Neil,100 the Court held that "to allow waiver of
statutory [minimum and overtime] wages by agreement would
nullify the purposes of the Act." 1°' On the other hand, when
waivers of private rights do not contradict the public interest,
properly made waivers are valid.1
0 2
A person may wish to waive her constitutional right to act
independent of any religious authority. She may prefer to
demonstrate her piety by submitting herself irrevocably and
completely to her religious leaders' oversight, and she might
assert, paradoxically, that her right to waive her religious
freedom is itself protected by the Free Exercise Clause. 0 3 Thus,
a state's decision to refuse to recognize her waiver might violate
the Free Exercise Clause and therefore be subject to strict
scrutiny."° Even if a state's decision not to enforce a contract
fully waiving a party's freedom of religion were subject to strict
scrutiny, however, the state's decision should be upheld.
99. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1988).
100. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
101. Id. at 707. For the same reason, the Court held that employees could not waive
their rights to liquidated damages for employer violations of the FLSA. Id.
102. Id. at 704; see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 372-73 (1979) (holding
that a criminal suspect can knowingly and intelligently effect a valid waiver of his privilege
against self-incrimination and right to counsel); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36
(1975) (holding that a criminal defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right
to be represented by counsel at trial); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (holding
that a state bears a heavy burden in proving that a criminal defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel); Adams
v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 277-79 (1942) (holding that a criminal
defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive his right to trial by jury, even when
he has also waived his right to counsel); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464-65,467-69
(1938) (holding that a criminal defendant can waive his right to counsel); Clark v. Barnard,
108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883) (holding that a state can waive its Eleventh Amendment
immunity from being sued in federal court by citizens of other states).
103. See Bleich, supra note 21, at 227-28 (suggesting that the Free Exercise Clause
requires secular courts to enforce contracts binding parties to a religious practice); see
also Bernard, supra note 37, at 558-59 n.76 (discussing generally an individual's right
to contract with regard to his religious practices).
104. It is unclear whether strict scrutiny would apply in such a case. In Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), the Supreme Court ruled that states cannot restrict
the free exercise of religion unless the restriction is necessary in order to accomplish
a "compelling state interest." More recently, however, the Court has held that the
Sherbert doctrine is limited to cases arising in the area of unemployment compensation
and similar fields of law in which the "state's eligibility criteria invite consideration of
the particular circumstances," or laws that make classifications based on religion.
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,884,886 n.3 (1990). In Smith, the Court refused
to apply strict scrutiny in reviewing the constitutionality of a religiously neutral statute
banning the use of peyote even though the statute did not make an exception for use
of peyote as part of a bona fide religious ceremony. Id. at 855. Two bills currently
pending in Congress may overturn the Smith decision. See H.R. 2797, 102nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1991); H.R. 4040, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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In defining the strict scrutiny standard as it applies to religion
cases, the Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,'0 5 observed from
previous cases involving restrictions on religious observance that
laws meeting this high standard of scrutiny invariably governed
conduct or actions that "posed some substantial threat to public
safety, peace or order.""° The Court did not define what it meant
by the word "order" in this phrase, but, from the cases used to
support the "public safety, peace or order" standard, the term
"order" appeared to refer to the social structure of American
society. Two of the cases that the Court cited to support its
standard were Reynolds v. United States'0 7 and Cleveland v.
United States,'08 both of which upheld criminal convictions of
Mormons practicing polygamy. Polygamy does not threaten
public safety or peace, but is inconsistent with a social structure
based on monogamous marriage.
If a state refused to enforce a waiver of religious freedom, a
religious organization might argue on appeal that the courts
should apply Sherbert's strict scrutiny test and overturn the lower
court's decision because the state was directly infringing upon
their organization's religious freedom. The court's refusal to
enforce the waiver would be a classification designed to impede
the practice of religion in general and would be, therefore,
unconstitutional.' Even if the refusal to enforce the waiver
would not impede any religious activity on the part of the
individual congregant, the court's refusal to enforce the
agreement arguably would impede the religious group's ability
to discipline a member who has agreed to waive her freedom."'
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. Id. at 403.
107. 98 U.S. 145, 165-66 (1878).
108. 329 U.S. 14, 20 (1946).
109. Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961) (plurality opinion) ("If the
purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions..., that
law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect."). But cf. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,883-86 (1990) (holding
that religion-neutral criminal statutes which may burden religious practices need not
meet the "compelling state interest" test).
110. From the point of view of the religious group, disciplinary actions may be
necessary to define the limits of acceptable behavior within the group, to persuade
wayward members to conform their behavior to the religious society's standards, and
to maintain the integrity of the group's commitment to its distinct religious doctrine and
tradition. See Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 779 (Okla. 1989); see also Miller,
supra note 49, at 283-84 (stating that the unity of a group is dependent on its members'
fear of being forced to live outside the group); Jan Shipps, Speaking Out: Sonia Johnson,
Mormonism and the Media, THE CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Jan. 2-9, 1980, at 5 (illustrating
how a church may use discipline to limit the diversity of belief and behavior of its
'members").
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Thus, the court's policy against enforcing the waiver may
constitute an unjust bias against religion.
A court's decision to hold unenforceable a waiver of free
exercise rights should withstand even a strict scrutiny challenge,
however. Even when it is clear that a party has intentionally
waived her free exercise rights, her agreement should not
constitute a legally enforceable waiver, but should instead be
considered an illegal contract in violation of the public interest."'
A contract authorizing civil courts to compel a party to submit
to religious authority would threaten the order of American
society in several ways. First, the United States is founded on
principles of freedom of thought and freedom from government
establishment of any particular religion. The Supreme Court
has determined:
In the realm of religious belief, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise .... But the people of this
nation have ordained in the light of history, that ... these
liberties are ... essential to enlightened opinion and right
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.
The essential characteristic of these liberties is, that under
their shield many types of life, character, opinion and belief
can develop unmolested and unobstructed." 2
This diffusion of ideas is central to a second element of the
American social order: the public goal of preserving an "unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail."" 3 "[T]he right of the public to receive suitable access
to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas ... is crucial
... "4 Religious groups sometimes attempt to restrict their
members' expressions of unconventional beliefs," 5 and sometimes
111. Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 552 F. Supp. 622, 631 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem., 713 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir
1983).
112. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
113. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
114. Id. The freedom of expression protected by the First Amendment does not compel
people to participate in the free market of ideas, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715
(1977), but requires that states protect the rights of people to choose to express their
ideas, Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 310.
115. See, e.g., Arthur H. Samuelson, Let My People Know, 250 THE NATION 603,603
(1990) (reviewing Adin Steinsaltz, THE TALMUD: THE STEINsALTz EDITION: VOLUME I: TRAC-
TATE BAVA METZIA, PART I (Israel V. Berman ed. & trans., 1989)) (mentioning that Orthodox
Jewish rabbis nearly excommunicated RabbiAdin Steinsaltz for criticizing the Patriarchs'
treatment of their wives); Diane Weathers & Mary Lord, Can a Mormon Support the
ERA?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 3, 1979, at 88.
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succeed." 6 Thus, contracts to waive a person's free exercise
rights and force the person to submit to the judgment of religious
bodies can violate the public interest in an open marketplace of
ideas. 117 Civil courts must therefore preserve the rights of all
people to choose whether to contravene religious doctrine by
expressing unconventional ideas or to follow their religious
teachings and keep any dissenting beliefs to themselves. A civil
court order silencing a congregant who dissented from established
religious doctrine after waiving his religious freedom would
violate not only the free speech rights of the congregant but also
the public interest in maintaining access to new ideas.
Finally, a plenary waiver of a person's free exercise rights could
conceivably give a religious group so much power over the
person's life that the waiver would amount to a contract for
slavery. In light of the history of slavery in this country,
culminating in a civil war and a resolution by the people and
states that "[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall
exist within the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction,""8 such a contract would be unsustainable. Since
Reconstruction, American society has been based on a concept
of liberty requiring that no person be subject to slavery in any
of its forms." 9
2. The Extent to Which Voluntary, Intentional Waivers of Free
Exercise Rights Should Be Enforced -Even though aspects of a
person's waiver of her free exercise rights would violate the
116. Charles H. Mindel & Robert W. Habenstein, Introduction to Bruce L. Campbell
& Eugene E. Campbell, The Monnon Family, in ETHNIC FAMILIEs IN AMERICA 386 (Charles
H. Mindel & Robert W. Habenstein eds., 2d ed. 1981) (quoting Mormon sociologists writing
about the Mormon family as having felt "pressures" from within the Mormon Church
and social community which may have introduced "bias" into their analysis); Edward
Alexander, A Talmud for Americans, COMMENTARY, July 1990, at 27, 29 (stating that
Orthodox Jewish Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz admitted "mistakes" in some of his writings and
offered to refund readers' money).
117. The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that the marketplace of ideas
protected under the First Amendment includes the marketplace of religious ideas. See
Heffronv. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness., Inc., 452 U.S. 640,647 (1981);
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1943); see also Davis v. Beason, 133
U.S. 333, 342 (1890) (stating that the religion clauses of the First Amendment were
adopted to prevent the government from imposing religious beliefs and behavioral
standards upon people and from using religion 'to control the mental operations of per-
sons").
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
119. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,438-41 (1968) (holding that the
Thirteenth Amendment and legislation adopted under its Enabling Clause were intended
to eradicate all "badges and incidents of slavery") (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (emphasis omitted)).
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public interest, civil courts should uphold such waivers to the
extent that the public interest is not implicated. Complete
refusal to enforce religious pacts deprives people of their free
exercise rights by limiting the extent of the commitment they
can make to their religious movements' 20 and violates the
Establishment Clause by creating an unjustified legal bias
against religious practice."'2 Enforcement of such contracts may
actually promote public policy by promoting the diversity of
beliefs and lifestyles that the Court embraces as desirable.
122
To the extent that civil courts immunize religious groups from
liability for "wholly internal" conduct involving congregants or
functionaries, parties should be allowed to waive their free
exercise rights. The legal distinction between an internal matter
and an external matter is demonstrated most clearly by Guinn
v. Church of Christ.23 In Guinn, the plaintiffhad been a member
of the defendant church, but withdrew her membership after the
church elders told her that they were planning to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against her in response to her sin of
fornication.' 24 Despite her withdrawal from the congregation,
the elders continued with the disciplinary process, informing the
entire congregation of the nature of her misconduct and publicly
disavowing her sin. 2 ' Ms. Guinn sued in tort for invasion of
privacy and outrage, and the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held
that the church was allowed to discipline its member up until
the time that she withdrew from the church, but could not
discipline her once she terminated her membership and
simultaneously terminated the "wholly internal" character of the
disciplinary action.
26
In order to enable members of religious groups to commit
themselves to their religious organizations without harming the
public interest in maintaining the structure of American society,
civil courts should allow people to waive their rights to withdraw
from religious societies, but should not allow them to waive their
freedoms of thought, expression, or conduct. This policy would
120. See Bernard, supra note 37, at 558-59 n.76; Bleich, supra note 21, at 228.
121. Cf. Donald A. Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal
Development: Part I The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513,518 (1968)
(stating that a failure of the state to aid religious groups only because religion will be
advanced discriminates against religion).
122. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940).
123. 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989).
124. Id. at 768.
125. Id. at 769.
126. Id. at 783, 786.
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protect against the possibility that civil courts would become
"excessively entangled" in religious groups' internal affairs, and
at the same time enable people to authorize that they be held
to a stricter standard of religious conduct. Under this policy,
Ms. Guinn, for example, if she had waived her right to free
herself from church discipline by withdrawing from her church,
would have been subject to a higher disciplinary standard. She
would have had no cause of action against her church for its
internal proceedings against her, but she could continue to violate
church doctrine if she chose to do so, and might sustain a cause
of action against the church if the church destroyed the "internal"
character of the discipline by disclosing the nature of her
misconduct to people not affiliated with the church.
B. Evidence of a Party's Intent to Waive
the Right to a Civil Hearing
1. Membership in a Religious Organization as Evidence of
a Party's Consent to be Bound by the Religious Group's Decrees-
The defendant church in Guinn v. Church of Christ argued that
the plaintiff, by becoming a member of the church, had consented
to be bound by the church's doctrines, including those doctrines
of which she was unaware.'27 Thus, the church argued, Ms.
Guinn had waived her right to withdraw from the church when
she became a member even though she did not know when she
joined that her membership would necessarily be for life."Is This
subsection discusses the question of whether members of religious
groups are, by virtue of their membership, contractually bound
to obey the decisions of religious tribunals without recourse to
civil courts.
In Watson v. Jones,1"9 the Supreme Court upheld a religious
tribunal's decree and declared that "[a]ll who unite themselves
to [a religious organization] do so with an implied consent to [the
authority of the organization's] government, and are bound to
127. Id. at 775-77.
128. Along similar lines, it has been argued that the doctrine of consent might protect
religious groups from "religious tort" liability. See Comment, Religious Torts: Applying
the Consent Doctrine as Definitional Balancing, 19 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 949, 961-64,971-76
(1986).
129. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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submit to it." 130 Perhaps the most forceful application of this
viewpoint came from a California appellate court in Mitty v.
Oliveira.131 In this case, Mrs. Oliveira, a Roman Catholic, was
denied the right to disinter the bodies of her husband and two
sons from a Catholic cemetery so that she could have the bodies
cremated. The cemetery's representatives argued that Catholic
doctrine prohibited disinterment under the facts of this case, and
the court held that Mrs. Oliveira willfully had submitted to the
church's rules:
What reasons does she give why a court of equity should
intervene and give [her] permission [to have the bodies
removed]? She says she was not informed of these canons
of the church which proscribe burial of the faithful in other
than hallowed ground and forbid the cremation of their
remains. That is hardly a reason .... [W]e do not think she
can plead ignorance of those doctrines of her church. Her
very membership tokens subscription to them. From the act
ofjoining a voluntary society there is implied an agreement
to abide by the society's rules and regulations, to the extent
at least that they are not in contravention of law or against
public policy.
132
The Oliveira court went on to quote from Permanent Committee
of Missions v. Pacific Synod of the Presbyterian Church:'
1
When a person joins an organized society, such as a church
or congregation associated for religious worship, under the
supervision and control of higher church courts, he neces-
sarily by that act agrees to abide by its rules of government
and thejudgments of its courts regularly made, and consents
that all his rights, privileges, and duties as a member, or
in respect to his membership, shall be governed and
130. Id. at 729; see also Nunn v. Black, 506 F. Supp. 444,448 (W.D. Va.), affd mem.,
661 F.2d 925 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1246 (1982); (holding that church
members did not have their constitutional rights abridged when they were expelled from
church membership and that the First Amendment prohibited judicial resolution of
whether or not the expulsion was in accordance with church procedures).
131. 244 P.2d 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952).
132. Id. at 927.
133. 106 P. 395 (Cal. 1909).
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controlled by those rules and judgments. This agreement
is always implied from the fact of membership. 3'
While the decision of the California court is appropriate with
regard to a person's religious rights, the religious government's
decisions should not impair the ability of a religious group
member to pursue secular rights through channels external to
the religious group.'" Any express or implied waiver of secular
rights must clearly indicate that the party intentionally
relinquished a known right.13 6 Although an intentional waiver
can be implied by conduct, 137 a person's mere membership in a
group adhering to doctrines with which the person is not familiar
cannot constitute an implied waiver, since the waiver must be
made intentionally and not by ignorance."3 On the other hand,
134. Oliveira, 244 P.2d at 927 (quoting Permanent Committee of Missions, 106 P. at
401).
135. While a civil court would not provide relief to a member of a religious group
who asserted that his co-religionists were using threats of excommunication to pressure
him to drop his secular court action, the court would provide relief if members of the
religious group threatened to use legally cognizable forms of harm to coerce him from
pursuing his case. See Grunwald v. Bornfreund, 696 F. Supp. 838,840 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
136. Dade County v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 826 F.2d 983,990 (11th Cir. 1987); Chas. H.
Tompkins Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co., 732 F. Supp. 1368, 1377 (E.D. Va. 1990);
Moen v. Norwest Bank, 647 F. Supp. 1333,1343 (D.N.D. 1986); see also Johnsonv. Zerbst,
304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) ("'[Clourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver
of fundamental constitutional rights and . . . 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss
of fundamental constitutional rights.'" (quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389,
393 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n., 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937))).
137. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979); Moen, 647 F. Supp. at 1343;
Midwest Petroleum Co. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1099, 1114 (E.D. Mo.
1985).
138. See Guinn v. Church of Christ, 775 P.2d 766, 777 (Okla. 1989); see also NCNB
Natl Bank v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931,938 (4th Cir. 1987) ("A waiver is an intentional aban-
donment of a known right, not a mere trick to catch one napping."); Midwest Petroleum,
603 F. Supp. at 1114 (stating that intent can be implied from conduct, but in order to
do so, "'there must be a clear, unequivocal and decisive act implying the intent and the
implication must be so consistent with an intention to waive that no other reasonable
explanation is possible'" (quoting Grebing v. First Nat'l Bank, 613 S.W.2d 872,876 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981))).
Thus, the correct outcome in Mitty v. Oliveira should have been to allow Mrs. Oliveira
to remove the bodies, as she had not knowingly waived her right to do so. Cemeteries
seeking to prevent disinterments could protect their interests easily by simply informing
the deceased's family prior to burial that the cemetery does not allow disinterments and
that, by burying a relative in the cemetery, the family is waiving its right to move the
body to another location at a later time. A legal requirement that cemeteries give this
type of advance warning protects the interests of both the cemetery operator and the
deceased's family by placing the obligation to speak upon the party most likely to be
aware of its legal rights and responsibilities.
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a properly made waiver can terminate even a constitutional right
as long as the waiver does not violate the public interest.
3 9
In Guinn, the plaintiff had a constitutionally protected right
to practice or not practice her religion as she saw fit. Included
within this right was the right to withdraw from her church
whenever she pleased. The church, however, asserted that just
as a familial relationship can never be severed, a member of the
church, upon joining, becomes a member for life and cannot
terminate her affiliation. 14° The problem in Guinn was how to
balance the rights of the religious group against the rights of the
individual member, since both parties are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause.' The agreement by both sides that Ms. Guinn
was unaware of the church's doctrine of membership for life was
crucial to the outcome of the case.
Ms. Guinn's status as a member of the Church of Christ was
an entirely internal matter for the church to decide. The Guinn
case was different from an excommunication case, however, in
that while an excommunication involves the dismissal of a
religious group member against her will, Guinn involved a
plaintiff who was maintained as a church member after she had
expressly declared herself to have withdrawn from the church.
Ms. Guinn's cause of action did not arise when the Church of
Christ refused to acknowledge Ms. Guinn's withdrawal, however.
The church could maintain Ms. Guinn's membership just as
easily as it could have excommunicated her before she declared
her separation. The church even could have excommunicated
Ms. Guinn after she withdrew." The church was obligated to
139. Office & Professional Employees Intl Union, Local 2 v. Washington Metro. Area
Transit Auth., 552 F. Supp. 622, 631 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem., 713 F.2d 865 (D.C. Cir.
1983).
140. Guinn, 775 P.2d at 776.
141. Id. at 790 (Wilson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
142. The Guinn court distinguished Ms. Guinn's situation from the plaintiffs position
in Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 926 (1987). Guinn, 775 P.2d at 780-81. Paul involved a religious society's
"shunning" of a former member. Unlike the Church of Christ, however, the defendant
inPaul merely rejected and excluded the plaintiff; it did not engage in any active, invasive
disciplinary activities requiring the plaintiffs consent. The Guinn court thus found that,
[flor purposes of First Amendment protection, religiously-motivated disciplinary
measures that merely exclude a person from communion are vastly different from
those which are designed to control and involve. A church clearly is constitutionally
free to exclude people without first obtaining their consent. But the First Amend-
ment will not shield a church from civil liability for imposing its will, as manifested
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recognize, however, that because Ms. Guinn had declared herself
to be separated from the church, Ms. Guinn now had the same
right to religious independence that any nonmember had. The
church violated this obligation when, in the process of excommu-
nicating her, the church committed the torts of invasion of
privacy and outrage."4 Ms. Guinn was therefore entitled to civil
court relief. As Justice Alma Wilson wrote in a separate opinion,
the church's right to free exercise extended only so far as it could
extend without interfering with Ms. Guinn's individual free
exercise rights.' The church's defense, that Ms. Guinn had
waived her constitutional right to follow her own religious
conscience when she accepted membership in the Church of
Christ, necessarily failed because the church itself admitted that
Ms. Guinn had not relinquished her right knowingly.
The question of waiver may become slightly more difficult when
a person is born into a religious group and is educated in the
group's teachings. Such a case would differ from Guinn in that
the person might well be aware of the religious group's major
doctrines and may have participated in certain ceremonies, such
as confirmation, bar or bat mitzvah, or adult baptism, which,
for the purposes of the religious group, might indicate acceptance
of its doctrines. These ceremonies, which often take place before
the person reaches majority age, are not necessarily void as
waivers simply because the actor is still a minor. Rather, the
waivers, if they are waivers, would only be voidable and might
become binding if not repudiated within a reasonable time after
the person reaches majority.
The solution to the problem presented here lies in the intent
of the party. Unlike estoppel, which involves a bilateral action
where one party relies on the intentionally or negligently
143. But see Guinn, 775 P.2d at 792, 796-97 (Hodges, J. dissenting) (arguing that
the plaintiffs "attempted unilateral withdrawal of membership" should have no effect
upon the Church Elders' freedom to discipline her because the Elders' disciplinary actions
did not present "a sufficient threat to public peace, safety or order as to warrant civil
court intervention"); David K Ratcliff, Note, Constitutional Law: Guinn v. Collinsville
Church of Christ: Balancing an Individual's Right to Tort Compensation and the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses, 42 OKLA. L. REV. 627, 638-40 (1989) (arguing that the
court should have allowed the church to retain authority over Ms. Guinn's prewithdrawal
acts, even after Ms. Guinn withdrew from the church, while the church should have lost
authority over her postwithdrawal acts).
144. Guinn, 775 P. 2d at 789, 791 (Wilson, J., dissenting in part and concurring in
part).
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misleading statements or conduct of another party," waiver
involves a unilateral act of forfeiture of known rights,"4 and looks
mainly to the intent of the party alleged to have relinquished
a right.'47 In determining whether a person has waived certain
religious freedoms by implication, a court should not emphasize
the person's behavior, but should instead look primarily to the
intent with which that person acted. An implied waiver can be
established only if the person's acts constitute "a clear, unequivo-
cal and decisive" indication of intent and if the person's acts are
so consistent with the intention to waive that "'no other
reasonable explanation [of the person's behavior] is possible. ' " "1 4
2. Participation in a Religious Court Proceeding as Evidence
of a Party's Consent to Be Bound by the Religious Group's
Decrees-Even actual participation in a religious court proceeding
is not sufficient evidence to prove that a party has voluntarily
waived all rights to a hearing in secular court.'49 Religious
communities are capable of exerting considerable social pressure
to hail their members into the religious group's courts, and a
person may feel compelled to participate in a religious court
proceeding to protect his status within his religious community
or to defend his reputation. Once the unwilling party has
submitted to the religious court's authority, the religious court
may resolve secular controversies without providing the
procedural and structural fairness that secular courts strive to
achieve. While the civil courts have no interest in the "funda-
mental fairness" of proceedings involving purely ecclesiastical
issues, ° the civil courts must not acquiesce in unfair ecclesiasti-
cal decisions regarding secular subject matter. In order to protect
145. See Black v. TIC Inv. Corp., 900 F.2d 112, 115 (7th Cir. 1990); Dade County
v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 826 F.2d 983, 989 (11th Cir. 1987); Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc.,
763 F.2d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 1985).
146. Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 692 F. Supp. 1171, 1179 (N.D.
Cal. 1988) rev'd on other grounds, 952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.").
147. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979); Young v. Amoco Prod. Co.,
610 F. Supp. 1479, 1489 (E.D. Tex. 1985), affd mem., 786 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1986).
Unlike the doctrine of estoppel, the doctrine of waiver does not require reliance on the
party's waiver of rights. See Intel Corp., 692 F. Supp. at 1179.
148. Midwest Petroleum Co. v. American Petrofina, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1099, 1114
(E.D. Mo. 1985) (quoting Grebing v. First Natl Bank, 613 S.W.2d 872,876 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981)).
149. While Indian tribal courts are not exactly analogous to ecclesiastical courts, see
supra note 11, it is interesting to observe that a parallel argument has been made with
regard to the tribal court systems, see Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 708 n.4 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. See supra note 45.
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the rights of parties who may have been coerced into participat-
ing in unfair religious court proceedings, civil courts should
refuse to accept mere participation in a religious court proceeding
as dispositive evidence of a party's intent to be bound by the reli-
gious tribunal's decree.
The fact patterns of cases involving Orthodox Jewish litigants
are particularly illustrative of the type of social pressure that
religious communities can impose upon their members in order
to make members conform to communal standards. Cabinet v.
Shapiro,5' for example, involved a controversy over whether a
kosher poultry shop's chickens were treifa (nonkosher).
152
According to the plaintiffs, the poultry had been properly
slaughtered by a certified kosher butcher, but the butcher had
not received his certification from the rabbi favored by the
defendants.'53 The defendants, in order to warn observant Jews
that the shop's chickens were not kosher, circulated handbills
which read in part:
Be Cautious...
Keep Your Home Kosher
The Chickens Sold at
Ben's Poultry Market
Atlantic and Congress Aves.
Are Treifa .. 154
The circulars, which were distributed throughout the city and
even on the plaintiff's premises, urged observant Jews to
... Buy Your Meats and Poultry From
Reliable Kosher Butcher Stores ....
151. 86 A.2d 314 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1952).
152. Id. at 316.
153. Id. at 317.
154. Id. at 316.
155. Id. Additional cases describe similar handbills and posters. See Meisels v. Uhr,
547 N.Y.S.2d 502, 508 n.** (Sup. Ct. 1989) (finding that two-foot by four-foot posters
allegedly affixed to street poles in Orthodox Jewish neighborhoods displayed petitioner's
photograph and reproductions of rabbinical letters condemning him for resorting to the
secular courts); Berman v. Shatnes Lab., 350 N.Y.S.2d 703,704 (App. Div. 1973) (finding
that a circular warned observant Jews that a rabbinical tribunal had found plaintiff
unqualified to test for shatnes, a prohibited mixture of linen and wool in a single garment
and that plaintiff continued to test for the mixture anyway).
Many immigrant groups set up dispute-resolution systems upon arriving in this country
to serve immigrant communities defined by nationality rather than religion. These judi-
catories, like the Jewish tribunals, often depended upon social pressure to reinforce their
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In another case, Grunwald v. Bornfreund,'" the plaintiff
alleged that the defendants tried to have him excommunicated
and declared a religious outcast in retaliation for his decision
to sue the defendants in civil court rather than in a rabbinical
court. 5 7 These types of cases suggest that mere participation
in a religious proceeding is insufficient to show that a party
intended her participation in religious proceedings to have
secular legal effects in addition to social and possibly spiritual
effects.
A civil court's refusal to uphold a religious court's decree even
when both parties participated in the religious proceeding creates
a problem, however, since a party who willingly submitted to the
religious court's jurisdiction can refuse to acknowledge the
religious judgment and reopen the case in civil court. 15' This
unfair situation can be avoided by putting religious courts on
notice that they can render enforceable decrees by using statutory
arbitration procedures. When civil courts choose to uphold
religious decrees resolving secular issues without any binding
arbitration agreement, the religious court should, at a minimum,
verify that the religious proceeding satisfies the requirements
of a common-law arbitration.
59
3. Binding Arbitration Agreement as Evidence of Waiver-
While secular courts must claim final authority over secular
issues, this claim of ultimate power creates a hardship for
members of religious groups that prohibit their adherents from
suing each other in secular courts. Some Christians, for example,
believe that the New Testament prohibits Christians from suing
power over secular matters. The authority of all of these tribunals, including the Jewish
courts, declined as community members assimilated into American culture and began
to see themselves more as individuals than as members of their groups. See generally
JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WINHOUT LAW? 69-94 (1983). The cases described here show,
however, that close-knit communities continue to exist in which significant pressure to
submit to communal, rather than governmental judicatories persists.
156. 696 F. Supp. 838 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
157. Id. at 839-40; see also Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602,605-06 (Sup. Ct. 1980),
affd mem., 444 N.Y.S.2d 690 (App. Div. 1981) (finding that respondents chose to appear
before a rabbinical court to avoid court-ordered ostracism by the Orthodox Jewish
community).
158. E.g., Berman, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (finding that the plaintiff brought a trade
libel action in civil court because a religious court found him to be unqualified to perform
a particular religious function).
159. See Kozlowski v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 439,445-46 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
see also Berman, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 704 (holding that because the religious arbitration was
similar to a common-law arbitration award, the parties were prohibited from relitigating
essentially the same issue in court).
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each other."6 Jewish law permits observant Jews to sue each
other, but usually only in Jewish courts.' 6 ' To resolve disputes
among their followers in a religiously acceptable manner,
Christians have organized a national network of Christian
Conciliation Services,'62 and Jews continue to operate Jewish
courts. 1" In addition, Jewish mediation/arbitration services are
available in Washington, D.C. and New York City.'
These religiously organized forums for alternative dispute
resolution would be of no concern to the secular legal system if
the parties to the religious proceeding never attempted to re-
argue their cases in civil court. Cases occasionally arise,
however, in which a party attempts to enforce an agreement
purporting to resolve a secular dispute through religious
mechanisms. 1"5 On other occasions, parties seek to assert a civil
claim after obtaining less than complete satisfaction through the
religious organization's process." Religious groups which seek
to achieve legally binding resolutions can ensure the enforceabili-
ty of their decrees by conducting their proceedings in accordance
with the arbitration laws of the state in which they sit.
By putting religious authorities on notice that ecclesiastical
proceedings to resolve secular disputes will be legally enforceable
only if the procedures conform with state arbitration laws, the
states enable religious groups to retain jurisdiction over their
160. The relevant passage states: "Must brother go to law with brother-and before
unbelievers? Indeed, you already fall below your standard in going with one another at
all." 1 Corinthians 6:7 (New English). Relying on this verse, the founder of the Christian
Conciliation Service of Metro Washington observed, "When a Christian takes another
Christian to court, it splashes mud all over Jesus Christ and it splashes mud al over
Christianity." UPI, Sept. 4, 1982, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
161. IraY. Kasdan,AProposalforP'sharah: AJewishMediation/ArbitrationService,
JEWISHACTION, Purim/Spring 5750/1990, at 22;see also Note,Rabbinical Courts: Modern
Day Solomons, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 49,53 (1970) (describing a medievalrabbinic
decree prohibiting Jews from suing other Jews in non-Jewish courts).
162. See State v. Burns, 332 N.W.2d 757, 772 n.8 (Wis. 1983) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting); see also Denny Hamilton, Service Offers Biblical Solutions to Legal Problems,
UPI, Feb. 14, 1988, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File; Alice M.A. Council
Curtis, CCS of Montana: Putting Peacemaking in Practice, Q., Spring 1987, at 22-23.
163. See BERNARD J. MEISLIN, JEwISH LAW IN AMERCAN TRIBUNALS 123-24 (1976); see
generally Note, supra note 161, at 56-68 (describing the different types of Jewish courts
in the United States in 1970).
164. Eugene L. Meyer, FShara Helps Jews Settle Disputes with Room for Compromise:
Mediation Service Brings Together Divided Parties, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1991, at F12.
165. E.g., Blue Spot, Inc. v. Superior Merch. Elecs. Co., 540 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App.
Div. 1989); Unger v. Unger, 547 N.Y.S.2d 529,530 (Sup. Ct. 1989); Katz v. Uvegi, 187
N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (Sup. Ct. 1959), affd, 205 N.Y.S.2d 972 (App. Div. 1960).
166. E.g., Louisonv. Fischman, 168 N.E.2d 340,343 (Mass. 1960); Berman v. Shatnes
Lab., 350 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (App. Div. 1973).
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members' secular affairs while preserving the members' due
process rights to fundamentally fair hearings. A signed
arbitration agreement serves as an objective manifestation of
a party's intent to be bound by the religious court's decree and
that the party knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights to
pursue the litigation in secular court without any religious
group's interference.'67 As in contract law, giving legal effect to
a signed agreement still leaves open the possibility that the
agreement will be invalidated if a party signed the agreement
under duress." Equally important, a formal agreement to
arbitrate requires a minimum standard of appropriate conduct
from the arbitrators in order for the proceeding to be legally
valid.
169
Agreements to arbitrate a dispute before ecclesiastical
arbitrators differ from other agreements to arbitrate in that a
party to an ecclesiastical arbitration agrees to be bound by
ecclesiastical law, and thus waives her freedom of religious
conscience. This distinction should be of no consequence,
however, as long as the waiver is made knowingly and volun-
tarily. Parties can enter binding agreements to arbitrate before
nonecclesiastical arbitrators, and an agreement should be equally
binding when the arbitrators happen to be religious leaders who
apply principles of religious doctrine in resolving issues. 7 0 Once
167. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
168. See, e.g., Mikel v. Scharf, 432 N.Y.S.2d 602, 606 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (holding that
a threat to submit to rabbinic authority or face ostracism is mere social pressure and
not duress).
169. See, e.g., Katz, 187 N.Y.S.2d at 517-18.
170. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. 1983). The Avitzur court held that
a ketubah, a Jewish marriage contract, signed by the defendant at the time of his
marriage, required that the defendant submit to the authority of a rabbinical tribunal
for religious proceedings related to his divorce. Under Jewish law, a divorced woman
is not eligible to remarry until she has obtained a get, a Jewish certificate of divorce,
from her former husband. Id. at 137. In ordering the defendant to appear before the
rabbinical tribunal, the Avitzur court rejected the husband's constitutional claim of
excessive entanglement and stated that it was merely enforcing an agreement that the
defendant had made with his wife. Id at 138. The court grounded its authority to do
so in the "neutral principles" approach approved by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). See infra notes 186-89 and accompanying text. Similarly,
the Illinois Court of Appeals upheld a trial court order, also based on a signed ketubah,
that a Jewish husband "participate in the verbal and physical acts necessary to validate"
a get. In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
Nonconstitutional arguments against enforcement of a ketubah include the possibility
that the parties did not intend secular legal consequences when they signed the marriage
contract, that the contract is too vague to be enforceable, and that the parties did not
understand the contract, which typically is written in Hebrew and Aramaic. For an
example of an English-language document designed to withstand both constitutional
and contract-law challenges, see Bleich, supra note 21, at 249 n.164.
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a party has agreed to submit to foreign law, the secular courts
should have no concern with whether the foreign law is from a
foreign country or from a religious group.17 ' The authority of
the religious arbitration panel should have the same scope as
other panels,'72 and under circumstances that give rise to a valid
common-law arbitration without a signed agreement, the
common-law arbitration should be upheld regardless of whether
the arbitrators are religious leaders. 73 All that matters is that
each party unequivocally expressed an intent to submit to the
arbitration panel's authority and voluntarily agreed to accept
the tribunal's decree as binding.
III. DIsPuTEs BETWEEN HIGHER AND LOWER
DENOMINATIONAL BODIES
The preceding analysis of relationships between religious
groups and their individual members can be applied by analogy
to relationships between denominations and their constituent
organizations. Just as civil courts must protect the First
Amendment rights of both religious societies and their members,
New York now has a statute which compels Jewish husbands to execute a valid Jewish
divorce decree in conjunction with civil dissolution of their marriages. N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 253 (McKinney 1986). The constitutionality of this statute is unclear, but New
York adopted the statute as an attempt to remedy the "tragically unfair condition" in
which the "requirement of a get is used by unscrupulous spouses who avail themselves
of [New York] civil courts and simultaneously use their denial of a get vindictively or
as a form of economic coercion." 1983 N.Y. Laws 2818-19 (italics added). In Goldman,
for example, the defendant attempted to use the get as a bargaining chip in his custody
battle with his wife. 554 N.E.2d at 1019-20, 1023-24; see also Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d
438, 440 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (holding that a former husband's offer of a get
was for economic concerns and was therefore not protected by the Establishment Clause).
171. Cf. Bernard, supra note 37, at 558-59 n.76 (explaining that a person may contract
away their civil rights to a religious organization).
172. See In re Berger, 437 N.Y.S.2d 690, 692 (App. Div. 1981) (holding that it is
against public policy to allow arbitration panels to probate a will). While some religions
have religious laws of inheritance, the Berger court held that the public policy in favor
of having wills probated in court supersedes any religious interest in the will. Of course,
in a case in which a party seeks to compel arbitration of a dispute, the party must assert
a cause of action cognizable under secular law. In Schwartz v. Jacobs, 352 S.W.2d 389
(Mo. Ct. App. 1961), the plaintiffwent to civil court to compel ecclesiastical arbitration
of a purely religious claim. The civil court held that the ecclesiastical nature of the claim
placed the dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the civil court. Id at 392. The civil court's
inability to compel arbitration of the religious claim is analogous to a civil court's inability
to enforce an ecclesiastical decree. See supra notes 21-30 and accompanying text.
173. See Berman v. Shatnes Lab., 350 N.Y.S.2d 703, 704 (App. Div. 1973); Kozlowski
v. Seville Syndicate, Inc., 314 N.Y.S.2d 439, 449 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
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the courts also must protect the rights of congregations and other
religious factions. 174 This Part argues that autonomous congrega-
tions, like individuals, have a constitutional right both to submit
to a higher religious body and to withdraw from such a body.
Congregations also have the right to waive their First Amend-
ment rights, and, because the policy reasons for limiting
individuals' ability to waive those rights do not apply in the
context of congregations, intelligent and unmistakable waivers
by congregations should be strictly enforced. This part argues
that the loss of property, the only secular harm that a congrega-
tion might suffer by waiving its First Amendment rights, should
be permissible where a proper waiver has been made. Thus, this
Part favors the "neutral-principles" approach to resolving reli-
gious property disputes and opposes the "polity" approach.
175
174. Cf. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 31 (D.C. 1987) (en
banc) (acknowledging that a religiously affiliated university has free exercise rights);
United Kosher Butchers Ass'n v. Associated Synagogues, 211 N.E.2d 332, 334 (Mass.
1965) (acknowledging that constitutional freedoms would be at risk if the court were
to force one kashruth certification board to accept the kashruth certification of another
certifying board).
175. A third possible approach to settlement of intradenominational relationships
involves statutory regulation. See Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God
v. Church of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). This Note does
not address the wisdom or inappropriateness of this approach, but instead focuses on
the resolution of disputes where the states' religious corporation law is not dispositive.
Justiciable disputes between denominations and congregations typically involve
disputes over the right to use religious property. This Part does not attempt to provide
a framework for resolving all religious property disputes, however, but instead focuses
on the relationship between congregations and their parent organizations. This Part
thus does not discuss adjudication of disputes between factions of a congregational
religious society. Numerous other authors provide detailed discussions of civil court
approaches to adjudication of religious property disputes. E.g.,Arlin M. Adams & William
R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf- Church Autonomy and the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1297-1312 (1980); Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court
Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513,
531-50 (1990); Troy Harris, Neutral Principles of the Law and Church Property in the
United States, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 515, 519-26 (1988); Dallin H. Oaks, Trust Doctrines
in Church Controversies, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 805,897-904; William G. Ross, The Need
for an Exclusive and Uniform Application of 'Neutral Principles" in the Adjudication
of Church Property Disputes, 32 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 263,305-15 (1987); Sirico, supra note
30, at 344-58; Roger W. Bennett, Note, Church Property Disputes in the Age of"Common-
Core Protestantism": A Legislative Facts Rationale forNeutral Principles of Law, 57 IND.
L.J. 163, 179-86 (1982); Robert J. Bohner, Jr., Note, Religious Property Disputes and
Intrinsically Religious Evidence: Towards aNarrowApplicationoftheNeutralPrinciples
Approach, 35 ViLL. L. REV. 949,956-76 (1990); Alan R. Friedman, Note, Church Property
Dispute Resolution: An ExpandedRole for Courts After Jones v. Wolf?, 68 GEO. L.J. 1141,
1142-56 (1980); Note, Judicial Intervention in Church Property Disputes-Some Constitu-
tional Considerations, 74 YALE L.J. 1113, 1127-39 (1965); Note, Judicial Intervention
in Disputes over the Use of Church Property, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1154-58, 1167-84
(1962); Giovan H. Venable, Note, Courts Examine Congregationalism, 41 STAN. L. REV.
719, 732-49 (1989).
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The polity approach assumes that a congregation which is part
of a hierarchical denomination has consented to be governed by
the parent organization.176 Therefore, a civil court faced with
a dispute between higher and lower bodies of a hierarchical
religious society must defer to the judgment of the religious
group's own tribunals even though such deference will almost
certainly favor the higher church. 177 Under this analysis, only
when a religious organization's structure is congregational rather
than hierarchical does authority over all controversies, both
religious and temporal, lie entirely within the local congregation
itself. 178
In Jones v. Wolf, 1 79 the Supreme Court unanimously agreed
that the polity approach is the proper method for review of
ecclesiastical adjudications of wholly religious issues." Such
issues are beyond both the authority and the competence of the
civil courts.' Application of the polity approach to secular dis-
putes, however, endangers congregations' First Amendment
rights. Just as mere membership in a religious organization is
insufficient to prove that an individual has waived his religious
liberties,8 2 submission to a hierarchy cannot by itself prove that
176. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 612-13 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). The
Supreme Court first explained its rationale for approving the polity approach in Watson
v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871), which adopted this method as the federal common-
law approach to resolving religious property disputes arisingwithin hierarchical religious
organizations. The Court stated:
In this country... [tihe right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist
in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create
tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association,
and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations,
and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite them-
selves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are
bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total
subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions
could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence
of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision
of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in
all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism
itself provides for.
Id. at 728-29.
177. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 619 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976)).
178. Id. (citing Watson, 80 U.S. at 724-26).
179. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
180. Id. at 602, 604; id. at 619 (Powell, J., dissenting).
181. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
182. See supra part II.B.1.
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a congregation has extinguished all of its rights as an independent
religious organization." 3 Because a waiver of rights must be
unmistakable,1' 4 ambiguities in the extent of the congregation's
waiver of its rights should be resolved in favor of congregational
autonomy. l'
The "neutral-principles" approach, approved in Jones v. Wolf,
enables civil courts to discover and to enforce the actual relation-
ship that the denomination and congregation established between
themselves. This method of resolving intra-denominational
disputes permits civil courts to examine deeds, church constitu-
tions, and other documents to adjudicate claims according to
principles of secular law without resolving religious controver-
sies."' Unlike the polity approach, the neutral-principles
approach provides religious societies with the flexibility to
structure their internal relationships according to their own
beliefs and administrative needs and empowers civil courts to
intervene to protect the rights which the disputants have
183. E.g., Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 422 N.E.2d 1337, 1343-44 (Mass. 1981)
("Although [Pentecostal Churches of the Apostolic Faith Association, Inc.] appears to
have a hierarchical structure, we cannot assume that, by voluntarily affiliating itself
with a hierarchical church, Antioch gave up the power to govern itself in matters such
as its selection of a pastor and its control and use of its own property." (footnote omitted));
First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church, 464 N.E.2d 454, 463 (N.Y.
1984) ("The mere fact of First Church's association with the denominational body, even
an association lasting 200 years, does not by itself support a finding that an implied trust
[granting the higher church a beneficial interest in congregational property] was created."),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984).
184. See supra notes 136-38.
185. The South Dakota Supreme Court, however, has found:
In the absence of a specific understanding or agreement preserving a separate identity
and expressing an intention to withhold its property, we think it must be presumed
that by voluntarily merging itself as an organ of the larger body, [the congregation]
intended to dedicate its all to the purposes of that body.
Reformed Bethanien Church v. Ochsner, 31 N.W.2d 249, 254 (S.D. 1948).
186. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 603-04 (1979). Jones v. Wolf expanded upon the
Supreme Court's earlier declaration that civil courts could apply "neutral principles of
law" to resolve religious property disputes without violating the First Amendment.
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440,449 (1969). These neutral principles are equally applicable to secular subject
matter other than property. Relying upon Jones v. Wolf, secular courts have applied
neutral principles of law to a contract dispute between a minister and his denomination,
see Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354,
1358-61 (D.C. Cir. 1990), and to a divorcecase involving suit to enforce a Jewish marriage
contract. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138-39 (N.Y. 1983); see also In re
Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1023 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (upholding trial court
order requiring a husband to obtain an Orthodox get in accordance with the marriage
contract).
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allocated to one party or the other."7 Of course, religious groups
do not always document their structures with sufficient clarity
to ensure that civil courts will be capable of enforcing the
relationship that the denomination and congregation intended
to create,1ss and sometimes a religious document may not be
amenable to secular interpretation.8 9 The neutral-principles
187. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603-04. The dissent in Jones v. Wolf argues that
the neutral principles approach restricts the scope of the Court's inquiry by excluding
evidence of church polity, from which an inference might be made that the parent church
has acquired authority over the congregation's property. See id. at 612-13 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). By insisting that such an inference be made, however, the dissenters would
exclude evidence of the actual extent of the higher church's authority and of the lower
church's autonomy.
188. Cf. Claude D. Morgan, The Significance of Church Organizational Structure in
Litigation and Government Action, 16 VAL. U. L. REV. 145,161 (1981) (urging religious
organizations to "exercise resourcefulness in structuring themselves to minimize judicial
intrusion in their organizational affairs and to substantially improve the prospects that
the government will relate to the organization on the same terms in which the church
perceives itself").
189. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604; id. at 612 (Powell, J., dissenting); Serbian
E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 723 (1976). Courts must be careful
not to attempt to read religious documents in secular terms when such a reading would
misconstrue the document's purpose. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). In actions to enforce a religious trust, for example, the terms of an intended
trust may be unenforceably vague if stated in religious terms. E.g., Katz v. Singerman,
127 So. 2d 515, 517 (La. 1961) (dedicating property for "the worship of God according
to the orthodox Polish Jewish Ritual"); Katz v. Goldman, 168 N.E. 763, 764 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1929) (dedicating property to promote the cause of orthodox or traditional Judaism).
Where a religious body with authority under religious law to interpret the trust terms
provides the civil court with an explanation of the trust terms' meaning in the context
of the case at bar, the civil court is bound to accept the religious authority's explanation.
See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 604 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709); see also
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 721 ("Nevertheless the Supreme Court of Illinois substituted
its interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother Church constitutions for that of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunals in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation.
This the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid."). Thus, under the framework
advocated in this Note, litigation of cases in which such an interpretation has been
provided is likely to focus on the issue of whether the religious authority that has inter-
preted the trust actually has the power to bind the subordinate body. See Milivojevich,
426 U.S. at 732 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But see First Presbyterian Church v. United
Presbyterian Church, 464 N.E.2d 454,458 (N.Y.) (holding that civil courts lack authority
to determine the extent of a Presbytery's authority over a local church), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1037 (1984).
When a trust document describes religious practices which a congregation must always
observe, civil courts should be allowed to enforce the terms of the trust if the principles
are stated in language comprehensible to the court. See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S.
at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring). Without this type of clear guidance, however, civil courts
have no authority to determine that a controversial ritual or belief constitutes a "sub-
stantial departure" from the purpose for which an express or implied trust was created.
Id. at 450. Before the Supreme Court's ruling inPresbyterian Church, a majority of states
appear to have prohibited religious factions from using church buildings for "purposes
constituting a fundamental departure from the traditional faith, customs, usages, and
practices of the church." Holiman v. Dovers, 366 S.W.2d 197, supp. op. on reh'g, 366
S.W.2d 203, 206-07 (Ark. 1963).
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approach offers religious groups an opportunity, however, to
ensure that secular jurists will settle intradenominational
disputes in a manner consistent with the relationship that the
parties intended. When the subject matter of a case is secular
rather than religious, the neutral principles approach avoids the
constitutional issues raised by the polity approach, protecting
the local congregation's autonomy without violating the higher
church's rights.
A dispute between a denomination and one of its constituent
congregations may be difficult to characterize as either wholly
religious or wholly secular, however."9 In Jones v. Wolf, the
majority and the dissenters disagreed about whether the
resolution of a religious property dispute should be considered
a religious or secular matter.' The dissent properly observed
that religious property disputes typically arise out of disputes
over ecclesiastical matters.'92 Spiritual significance also can
permeate throughout a building'93 or a parcel of land."M For
these reasons, when a religious body has the authority to decide
who may use religious property, the civil courts must defer to
the religious authority's decree.'95 The question in Jones v. Wolf,
however, was whether the right to possess the local church's
property was vested in the church hierarchy or in the schismatic
faction.' The majority recognized that this is a secular question
190. See supra note 21.
191. Compare Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 ("There can be little doubt about the
general authority of civil courts to resolve this question. The State has an obvious and
legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a
civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively.")
with id. at 614 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("When civil courts step in to resolve intrachurch
disputes over control of church property, they will either support or overturn the
authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church itself.").
192. Id. at 616 (Powell, J., dissenting).
193. See Dignity Twin Cities v. Newman Ctr. & Chapel, 472 N.W.2d 355,357 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
194. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451
(1988); see also Exodus 3:5-6 (relating that when God spoke to Moses from the burning
bush, God said, "Come no nearer.., the place where you are standing is holy ground");
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, FROM BEIRUT TO JERUSALEM 300-01,305,306-12,319-21 (1989)
(explaining the significance of the land of Israel to the Jewish religion).
195. See Dignity, 472 N.W.2d at 357. Of course, religious groups also might own
property which lacks a religious character, in which case secular antidiscrimination laws
must be observed if the laws do not include a broadly worded religious exemption. Id.
196. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602.
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involving disposition of secular rights.197 Thus, secular courts
have proper authority to resolve such disputes as long as the
civil tribunals do not, in the process of resolving the property
issues, also become entangled in religious controversies.
198
The issue of whether a subordinate body has the autonomy
to withdraw from a denomination and take its property with it
depends upon the history of the relationship between the higher
and lower church and on the property arrangements the parties
have made between themselves. Factors that a civil court should
consider include the following: whether the subordinate body
existed as an independent religious society before uniting with
the higher church;'" whether the subordinate body agreed to be
bound by the decrees of the higher authority; °° whether the
property in question was acquired before or after the two
organizations became affiliated;201 whether the property was
197. Id. at 602; see also Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,445,449 (1969) (stating that civil courts can resolve
church property disputes under secular law but must not resolve any religious controversy
underlying the property dispute).
198. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602. In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,
426 U.S. 696 (1976), the majority and dissenters disagreed about whether civil courts
can resolve intradenominational administrative disputes which impact upon religious
property rights. The majority held that administrative controversies are as immune
as doctrinal controversies are from secular intervention. Id. at 709-10. The dissenters
believed that civil courts impartially can resolve administrative disputes arising within
religious organizations just as easily as they can resolve comparable controversies arising
within other voluntary associations. Id. at 725-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
This Note agrees with the majority's position that civil courts must not interfere in
denominational administration where no secular right is involved. This Note disagrees
with the majority, however, in one respect: civil courts must be allowed to resolve the
singular issue of whether a subordinate body can withdraw altogether from a hierarchical
church and take its property with it. In Milivojevich, the Supreme Court of Illinois
resolved this question using the neutral-principles-of-law approach and held, among other
things, that the American-Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox Church did not
have the right to secede. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 328 N.E.2d 268,
282-84 (II. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
199. See Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. 541,544-46 (Ct. App.
1981); Baldwin v. Mills, 344 So. 2d 259, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977), rev'd on other
grounds, 362 So. 2d 2 (Fla. 1978), reversal vacated, 443 U.S. 914 (1978), reversal
reinstated, 377 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1979). The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Florida
District Court of Appeal's decision in Baldwin v. Mills because the district court applied
the neutral-principles approach and the supreme court held that Florida law requires
application of the polity approach. 362 So. 2d at 7. The district court's opinion remains
instructive, however, with regard to application of the neutral-principles approach.
200. See Babcock Memorial Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Baltimore, 464 A.2d
1008,1012 (Md. 1983); Antioch Temple, Inc. v. Parekh, 422 N.E.2d 1337,1343-44 (Mass.
1981).
201. See Baldwin v. Mills, 344 So. 2d at 268 (Smith, J., dissenting).
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acquired in the name of the higher or lower church; 2 whether
the higher church provided funds for the acquisition or improve-
ment of the property in question;2' whether a state statute
regulates the disposition of property held by organs of the
denomination;2° whether church documents expressly vest legal
or equitable title in the higher or lower body;2 °5 and whether any
other evidence indicates that an express or implied trust exists
in favor of one of the claimants.2' The polity approach ignores
these factors, and always vests title in the higher church.2 7 The
polity approach is therefore likely to inhibit congregations from
joining larger denominations for fear that the denomination will
take possession of the congregation's property if the two organiza-
tions ever separate. By examining the parties' actual rela-
tionship, the neutral-principles approach frees religious
organizations to experiment with a variety of ecclesiastical
structures and affiliations, effectively enhancing free exercise.
Of course, if a court finds that the local congregation has
extinguished its right to remove its property from the control of
the parent organization or never had such a right to begin with,
202. See Harris v. Apostolic Overcoming Holy Church of God, Inc., 457 So. 2d 385,
387 (Ala. 1984); Fluker Community Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445, 446, 448 (La.
1982).
203. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 544-46; Baldwin, 344 So. 2d at 261; Carnes v. Smith,
222 S.E.2d 322, 327 (Ga. 1976); First Presbyterian Church v. United Presbyterian Church,
464 N.E.2d 454, 462 (N.Y. 1984).
204. See Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 555; Carnes, 222 S.E.2d at 327-28.
205. Harris, 457 So. 2d at 387; Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 546; Crumbley v. Solomon,
254 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Ga. 1979); Carnes, 222 S.E.2d at 328;Fluker Community Church,
419 So. 2d at 448; Maryland & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God,
241 A.2d 691,696-97 (Md. 1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 528, reaffd, 254 A.2d 162 (Md. 1969),
appeal dismissed per curiam, 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
206. Courts in different states will reach different conclusions regarding the existence
of a valid trust because the relevant state law to be applied under the neutral-principles
approach will vary from state to state. Compare Parent v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 436
A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981) (holding that the court will not enforce any express or implied
trust in favor of the local church unless the local congregation produces "a writing plainly
evidencing conditions or restrictions on the bishop's use of the [local] property") with
Bishop & Diocese v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 100 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) ("Colorado recognizes
that the intent to create a trust can be inferred from the nature of property transactions,
the circumstances surrounding the holding of and transfer of property, the particular
documents or language employed, and the conduct of the parties.").
207. Before a court can reach a finding in favor of the higher church, the court must
be certain that the disputants in fact are united under a hierarchical structure. This
issue is an issue of fact for the civil courts to resolve, and a statement by the purported
higher church that a hierarchical relationship exists is not binding on the civil tribunal.
See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 725 (1976) (White, J.,
concurring); Southside Tabernacle v. Pentecostal Church of God, Inc., 650 P.2d 231,235
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
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then, as under the polity approach, the dispute must be resolved
in favor of the higher church. 2°  A congregation which has
submitted itself fully to the control of a higher ecclesiastical
organization is obligated to abide by the dictates of that
organization.' The higher church determines rules of law and
religious observance and, in the event of a schism, determines
who has the right to use the congregation's property.
The policy concerns which limit the rights of individuals to
waive their First Amendment rights do not apply to waivers by
congregations. Even if an autonomous congregation waives these
rights completely, each individual member retains the right to
profess unconventional beliefs,21 to participate in the market-
place of ideas,211 and to abandon the religious group if he so
chooses.21 2 As a collection of individuals, an entire congregation
can exercise these individual liberties all at once. 213 All that the
congregation risks losing by executing a valid plenary waiver
is its property. This type of loss, while significant, is not as con-
trary to public policy concerns as is the loss of individual auton-
omy and freedom of expression. Indeed, while personal liberties
are inalienable, the law promotes alienability of property.214
Thus, civil courts should enforce congregations' plenary waivers
of their First Amendment rights.
Strict enforcement of these waivers promotes the parent
organization's free exercise rights without violating the
congregation's rights. While the Establishment Clause should
be understood to prohibit civil enforcement of denominational
208. Thus, several courts have observed that, under the fact patterns before them,
the same results would be reached regardless of whether the courts applied the neutral-
principles or polity approach. See, e.g., Fonken v. Community Church, 339 N.W.2d 810,
819 (Iowa 1983); Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 466, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
209. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595,617-18 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Milivojevich,
426 U.S at 710-12.
210. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
213. One court stated:
The individual defendants are free to disassociate themselves from St. Stephen's
[Parish] and The Protestant Episcopal Church and to affiliate themselves with
another religious denomination. No court can interfere with or control such an
exercise of conscience. The problem lies in defendants' efforts to take the church
property with them. This they may not do.
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Graves, 417 A.2d 19, 25 (N.J. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1131 (1981).
214. See generally MERRILL I. SCHNEBLY, 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 26.1-.3 (A.
James Casner ed., 1952).
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decrees regarding congregational property where the congregation
has not waived its property rights, the Free Exercise Clause should
be understood to prohibit secular courts from intervening when
the congregation has made a proper waiver. Denominational
leaders need the power to maintain denominational standards
of belief and conduct, to expel dissidents, and to protect the
integrity of the prayer environment. 215 One -aspect of this power
is the authority to bar dissenters from denominational property.
Thus, even when a majority of a congregation's members elect
to secede from the higher church, if a proper waiver has been
made, the congregation's property must be held for the exclusive
use of the minority faction which continues to affiliate with the
higher church.216
Protestant Episcopal Church v. Barker217 serves as an example
of how a civil court might apply the approach advocated in this
Note to resolve a religious property dispute. Barker involved a
suit by the regional and national bodies of the Protestant
Episcopal Church in the United States of America (PECUSA)
to obtain title and possession of property owned by four Los
Angeles church congregations which had seceded from the
denomination. 218 Three of the churches had been formed as
constituent congregations of PECUSA but retained title to their
property in their own names, with no restrictions or limitations
on the congregations' authority to possess or dispose of the
property.219  These three congregations each contributed
substantial sums of money to the Los Angeles Diocese during
the course of the congregations' affiliation with the regional and
national church.22 9
The fourth congregation, worshipping at Holy Apostles Church,
also held its church property in its own name, but was unlike
the other three churches in several other respects. First, Holy
Apostles Church was incorporated as a "subordinate body" of
PECUSA and the Los Angeles Diocese, and, therefore, under
California's Corporations Code, upon dissolution it was to convey
its property or proceeds from the sale of its property to the higher
church.22' Second, Holy Apostles' articles of incorporation
215. See supra note 110.
216. E.g., Bennison v. Sharp, 329 N.W.2d 466, 475 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
217. 171 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Ct. App. 1981).
218. Id. at 542-43.
219. Id. at 544-45.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 546.
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declared that the congregation's property was dedicated
irrevocably to religious or charitable purposes, and that, upon
dissolution, the congregation's property would be used or sold
to benefit a charitable fund organized by the diocese.' Finally,
unlike the other three churches, Holy Apostles was incorporated
after the diocese had adopted a canon declaring that upon
dissolution of a parish, all parish property is conveyed to the
diocese.'
The court held that, with regard to the first three churches,
no express trust existed in favor of the diocese or national
church.22 Thus, these congregations retained their property
even after they withdrew from the higher church. With regard
to Holy Apostles Church, however, the court found that the
language used in the church's articles of incorporation, along
with applicable provisions of California's Corporations Code
and the diocesan canon adopted prior to Holy Apostles' incor-
poration, all indicated that the property of Holy Apostles Church
was subject to an express trust in favor of the diocese.' The
court further found that the diocese had effectively revoked
Holy Apostles' charter.' 6 The court therefore concluded that
the diocese had acquired a right to secure possession and title
to the congregation's property.22
222. Id.
223. Id. at 546.
224. The court stated:
We conclude that no express trust exists in the property of St. Matthias, St. Mary's,
and Our Savior. St. Matthias and St. Mary's held title to their property in their
own names, paid for it out of their own funds, did not alienate it in any express
manner in their articles of incorporation, and did not subject themselves to express
restraints on their property .... It is true that these churches voluntarily con-
formed to certain financial requirements of the Diocese .... None of this, however,
amounted to the creation of an express trust. The situation of Our Savior is similar
Id. at 555.
225. Id. at 556. In effect, the court either found that Holy Apostles Church never
existed as an autonomous property-holding organization separate from PECUSA, or that,
if Holy Apostles had at one point been autonomous, it waived all of its autonomy,
including its property rights, when the church incorporated as a "subordinate body" of
the diocese. For additional examples of cases in which application of the neutral
principles approach led to a decision in favor of the higher church, see Harris v. Apostolic
Overcoming Holy Church of God, Inc., 457 So. 2d 385,387 (Ala. 1984); New York Annual
Conference v. Fisher, 438 A.2d 62, 73-74 (Conn. 1980); Carnes v. Smith, 222 S.E.2d 322,
328 (Ga. 1976); Fluker Community Church v. Hitchens, 419 So. 2d 445,448 (La. 1982).
226. Barker, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 556.
227. Id.
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By focusing on the actual arrangement that each congregation
had made for the disposition of its property upon separation from
the diocese, the Barker court reached a result that was likely
to be more consistent with the intent of the congregations that
had chosen to unite with PECUSA than the court would have
reached if the court had applied the polity approach. Barker
illustrates that a single denomination can have different types
of legal relationships with its constituent congregations and
fosters a legal environment in which religious societies are free
to innovate in structuring their organizations. Barker also sends
a warning to religious organizations. Religious societies must
document intra-denominational relationships in such a way that
civil courts will be able to enforce the relationships that the
parties actually intended to create.
CONCLUSION
By promising religious freedom both to religious groups and
to individuals, the First Amendment promotes not only diversity
in individual religious belief and expression, but also diversity
of religious cultures. Ecclesiastical tribunals help religious
groups maintain their cultural integrity by interpreting doctrine
and by defining the behaviors expected of group members.
Because the First Amendment prohibits secular authorities from
becoming entangled in religious controversies, civil courts have
no authority to review ecclesiastical judgments when the decrees
involve only wholly religious subject matter. When the civil
adjudication of a secular right is dependent upon the resolution
of an ecclesiastical controversy, the civil court is bound to accept
the judgment of the highest ecclesiastical judicatory that will
consider the case.
The Free Exercise Clause removes only religious decisions
rendered in good faith for spiritual purposes from civil court
jurisdiction. Ecclesiastical decisions tainted with fraud or
collusion, in which religious courts resolve disputes in bad faith
for secular purposes, do not merit protection from civil court
review. Civil courts must defend parties' secular rights even
when the party violating those rights is a religious actor. In
religious fraud cases, civil courts must do so by providing secular
remedies, yet must be careful to avoid providing a religious rem-
edy, such as an injunction overturning a religious decree.
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When individuals submit secular issues to religious court
jurisdiction, civil courts must not enforce the ecclesiastical decree
unless certain requirements are met. The parties to the religious
proceeding must have submitted the dispute to ecclesiastical
jurisdiction voluntarily, intentionally waiving their known right
to have a secular forum resolve the dispute. This waiver of a
right protected under the Establishment Clause must not violate
the public's interest in maintaining individuals' freedom of
thought and speech and in having a society free from involuntary
servitude. Where the parties properly have waived their
Establishment Clause right without violating these public policy
concerns, secular courts must accord ecclesiastical adjudications
of temporal issues the same respect that the secular courts would
extend to decrees by secular arbitrators.
Subordinate bodies of hierarchical religious societies also have
rights under the First Amendment's religion clauses. To protect
the rights of these groups without violating the rights of the
parent denomination, civil courts should use the neutral-
principles-of-law approach to resolve secular disputes between
higher and lower religious bodies. Unlike the polity approach,
the neutral-principles approach provides civil courts with a
practical method of resolving these disputes in a manner
consistent with the actual relationship that exists between the
higher and lower church. By facilitating this level of consistency,
the neutral-principles approach assists civil courts in striking
the proper balance between respecting religious leaders' need
to maintain the integrity of their religious cultures and the
secular courts' obligation to protect the liberties both of
subordinate bodies and of individuals.
